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The Third Try at World Order

U.S. Policy for an Interdependent World

by Harlan Cleveland

An essay prepared for
"A Declaration of INTERdependence"
Bicentennial Era Program (1976–1989)

World Affairs Council of Philadelphia



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Harlan Cleveland, political scientist and public executive, is Director of the Program in International Affairs of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, with headquarters in Princeton, N.J.
He was a Rhodes Scholar in the late 1930s; economic warfare specialist and United Nations relief operator (in Italy and China) during the 1940s; foreign aid administrator (The Marshall Plan), magazine editor and publisher (*The Reporter*) and graduate school dean (the Maxwell School at Syracuse University) during the 1950s; Assistant Secretary of State and United States Ambassador to N.A.T.O. in the 1960s; and president of the University of Hawaii from 1969 to 1974. His many writings include *The Overseas Americans* (1960), *The Obligations of Power* (1966), *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (1970), *The Future Executive* (1972) and *China Diary* (1976).

The World Affairs Council of Philadelphia

A Declaration of INTERdependence

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The Third Try at World Order

U.S. Policy for an Interdependent World

by Harlan Cleveland

Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

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CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD v

1. A VERY SPECIAL MOMENT 1

2. NOBODY IN CHARGE 5

A world of dangers, distrust and disorder . . . A long agenda of creative effort just ahead

3. INTERDEPENDENCE: A QUESTION OF DEGREE 11

A familiar and uncomfortable idea . . . Interdependence as "fact" . . . Interdependence as choice, within limits

4. INTERDEPENDENCE: WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT 15

The search for benefits without burdens . . . Varieties of dependence . . . The Third World: resentment, disenchantment, pride . . . The United States: rediscovery of a 200-year-old idea

5. INTERDEPENDENCE: THE LABYRINTH OF MANKIND 25

"Getting it all together" . . . An ecological outlook . . . The sevenfold limits to choice

6. THE THIRD TRY: BEYOND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 33

A balance of uncertainties . . . From "deterrence" to "equivalency" . . . The spread of nuclear mobilization bases . . . Arms sales as an addiction . . . Checkrein on terrorism . . . "Third parties" for peacemaking

7. THE THIRD TRY: GROWTH WITH FAIRNESS 49

A global fairness revolution . . . Priority for basic human needs . . . U.S.A., the reluctant flywheel . . . Band-Aid or surgery? . . . The Third World sets the pace . . . Six issues for bargaining . . . Agenda for a deal

Contents (Continued)

PAGE

8. The Third Try: World-Order Diplomacy 71

Multilateral is a must . . . Where does the U.N. fit in? . . . Consensus and catalysis . . . Consortia of the concerned

9. The Melding of "Foreign" and "Domestic" 83

International change means internal change . . . External relations are homemade . . . A pluralistic foreign policy

10. Attitudes in Transition 93

People lead the leaders . . . An emerging American worldview

Notes 101

Appendix A. A Declaration of INTERdependence, by Henry Steele Commager 107

Appendix B. The INTERdependence Assemblies 111

Appendix C. Aspen Institute Consultants 115

Appendix D. Participants at Sugar Loaf Consultation 117

Foreword

IN AN OFT-TOLD DIALOGUE with a thousand variants, one person sets a grandiloquent goal, another person asks how so ambitious an aim is to be achieved, and the first person says, "I've made the policy; all you have to do is carry it out."

In preparation for the American Revolution Bicentennial of 1976, the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia commissioned the distinguished American historian Henry Steele Commager to produce a Declaration of INTERdependence. But the world-minded Philadelphians were not content to leave that "policy" at the level of eloquent rhetoric. Having declared our interdependence, they set about—as their ancestors had done with their Declaration two centuries before—to carry the words into action.

While bold enough "to make no little plans," the men and women of Philadelphia are among the world's most practical souls. Their Quaker forebears did not allow their piety to inhibit their business enterprise. Their community leadership is still mostly carried by men and women of affairs. And Benjamin Franklin, on whose turf the Declaration of INTERdependence was drafted, was not only a philosopher but a practical inventor, an innovative diplomat and a curmudgeonly publisher.

In his practical spirit, during the Spring and Summer of 1976, Philadelphia was host to an extraordinary series of Interdependence Assemblies, certainly one of the most imaginative ways the Bicentennial was celebrated anywhere in the Nation. What the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia did was to arrange with national organizations—most of which had planned their annual conventions in Philadelphia for Bicentennial reasons—to devote one major session to considering the implications for their own specialties of America's newly-discovered interdependence.

Lawyers brooded about the inadequacy of national law to handle international issues; bankers pondered monetary reform; business groups struggled with trade policy; chemists debated the simultaneous equations of food and population; political and social thinkers tried to

rethink the Constitution; scientists considered the "outer limits" of resources; experts on conflict resolution took a new look at U.N. peace-keeping; Girl Scouts from all over the world drafted a "Philadelphia Compact" on global interdependence; and the Club of Rome, meeting in Philadelphia, backed away somewhat from its earlier anti-growth stance and discussed "organic growth" instead.

It is the essence of interdependence that, as E. B. White said long ago, ". . . . there's no limit to how complicated things can get, on account of one thing always leading to another." The World Affairs Council in Philadelphia was still not satisfied to consider separately the parts of interdependence; it decided to try to relate them to an interdependent whole. That is why the Philadelphians asked the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies to join them in bringing together in one Consultation the leadership of the Interdependence Assemblies, and thereafter to draft "a manifesto on America's new manifest destiny." This booklet results from that assignment.

"Whether we can do as well as the authors of the Federalist Papers remains to be seen," said one of the early memos about what to do in 1976 beyond declaring American interdependence. "But it is high time that there be a serious effort to match in relevance and eloquence for our Third Century that extraordinary product of the intellect and spirit of the Founders. . . . Certainly the confusions of our purposes, and our need for this kind of creativity, are even greater today than they were when Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison and their contemporaries were boldly charting an experiment in republican democracy on a still unexplored continent."

The content of this writing is in an important sense the collective product of the Philadelphia Interdependence Assemblies during the Spring and Summer of 1976. The concept of this paper was outlined by a planning group of Philadelphians and outside consultants, sharpened by leaders of some of the Assemblies at the three-day Consultation (held at the Sugar Loaf Conference Center in Philadelphia) from July 20 to 23, and refined by the consultants during a two-week workshop at the Aspen Institute in Aspen, Colorado, during August.

In the course of much stimulating talk, the citizens and consultants who participated in all this preparatory work said some strikingly relevant things; the reader will find a very small selection

of them scattered through these pages together with words of wisdom from other sources. Footnotes are not used, but some follow-up references will be found for each Chapter in the Notes. The Appendix contains the text of the Commager Declaration, a list of the Assemblies, and the rosters of Aspen Institute consultants and participants in the Sugar Loaf Consultation. The "Declaration of INTERdependence" project was financed by a major grant from the Bicentennial Commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, together with the Rockefeller Foundation and numerous Philadelphia donors.

Fragments of the argument in this booklet have recently appeared in *The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Service Journal, The National Observer, Worldview,· Oceans* and a Bicentennial Lecture, "America's Not-So-Manifest Destiny," to be published in a book entitled *The American Revolution: A Continuing Commitment* (Washington, Library of Congress, 1976). They have not previously lived together, taking each other into account.

I am especially indebted to Stephen K. Bailey, Richard N. Gardner, Elmore Jackson, Robert Neumann, John Palfrey, James Perkins, Seymour Rubin, Thomas W. Wilson, Adam Yarmolinsky and Charles Yost for many helpful suggestions; to Ralph Ketcham for enlightening historical analysis; to Jane Pisano for knowledgeable research on the new international economic order; to Bowen Dees for leadership in the planning group and the Consultation; to the Philadelphia members of the planning group for both enthusiasm and tolerance; to John Reichard and David Wendt for editorial and administrative support; and to Frederick Heldring, General Chairman of "A Declaration of INTERdependence" for the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, for his confidence and encouragement throughout. Judith Himes checked and corrected the first draft; Dorothy Birch and Fay Yoshimura helped make the manuscript readable. But I must add the author's standard disclaimer: whatever problems the reader has with this booklet, complaints should be addressed to me.

HARLAN CLEVELAND

Princeton, New Jersey
October 4, 1976

We have it in our power to begin the world all over again. A situation similar to the present, hath not appeared since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand.

Tom Paine (1775)

I own one share in the corporate earth, and I am uneasy about the management.

E. B. White (1962)

Today is the last day we have left to sit around discussing and backing away from our world problems.

Margaret Kelley, a Girl Scout (1976)

1.

A Very Special Moment

SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT happened on Sunday the 4th of July, 1976. Millions of us gathered in our decaying and unruly cities, pounded our palms with the rhythms of John Philip Sousa, jostled each other in cheerful non-violent crowds—and felt for a moment a sense of unity, overcame for a moment our Bicentennial cynicism, decided for a moment that there is, after all, something special about being an American.

We have a vivid cultural memory of another time when people poured onto the streets to speak to each other, or watched their television sets intently. It was nearly 13 years ago, when the assassination of President John Kennedy commenced a cascade of shocks, scandals, tragedies and embarrassments unprecedented in American history. For thirteen years, that steady sense of American destiny which had long been the tallest of the tall ships seemed swept from its course, set adrift in a polluted sea of political killings, military ineffectiveness, economic hardship and moral disillusion.

If that July 4th feeling means that we are at long last emerging from our slough of despond, perhaps we can look forward to thirteen bicentennial years of recovery, resurgence and recommitment to the human values we have all had occasion to remember this year. And if the American people have truly turned that fateful corner, 1976 may have a very special place in world history.

For like it or not—and most Americans do not like it very much—the most important single factor in world politics is still what the American people decide to do or not to do.

Leaders and élites and silent majorities everywhere—whether they wish us well or ill, whether they think of us as a strong but overbearing John Wayne or a strong but bumbling Li'l Abner, whether they are tired of our pervasive presence or wish it were more effective, whether they care out loud or pretend, like the Chinese, to be indifferent to American politics—have a stake in the mental health

of the world's largest and liveliest democracy. Impatient with our processes but uncomfortably aware of how much the outcome might affect their individual lives and national destinies these next few years, they wait to see what kind of America will emerge from our traumatic times just past. They have to be curious (apprehensive or hopeful, according to political taste) about what role Americans, acting through their Federal government and also through a rich profusion of non-governmental organizations, decide to play in the twentieth century's third try at world order.

There is simply no way, now, in which the American people can know themselves except, ultimately, in terms of their posture and their conduct in the world. To use the language of psychology, they cannot have any secure sense of their identity except by feeling that their country is acting in the world with deliberation, to a purpose that is known and understood and with a will that is certain.

Henry Fairlie, journalist

The first try, the League of Nations, was the product of Woodrow Wilson's strong initiative and the victim of his weak follow-through: the United States wrote most of the club rules, then decided not to join the club. In its weakened condition, it could not survive the rise of fascism, Naziism and militarism.

The second try, the United Nations, was launched by the victors in the Second World War, to manage the world they had won. It was weakened by tepid Soviet participation from the start, and transformed by the independence movement that nearly tripled its membership in thirty years. The U.N. received the unremitting support of the United States as "man's last best hope" until (by the rules we had helped write into its Charter) the poor-country majority took over from us the practice of bloc voting on symbolic resolutions, thus intensifying our isolationist superfears and disappointing our internationalist superhopes. Today, the U.N. reflects quite accurately the political turmoil and tensions of a world in deep transition. But as presently organized and used by its members, it is ill-adapted to arrange the new bargains that are urgently needed, or for getting decisions made on a lengthening list of new global issues.

The third try at world order stems from the growing awareness of the interdependence of peoples, problems, and policies. It begins for Americans with changes in attitudes and institutions at home, and extends to leadership in fashioning new cooperative attitudes and institutions for a world that is not yet a community.

We will not be talking about "American leadership" in its old overblown, ethnocentric, self-righteous meaning, but about new styles of shared leadership, with a newly global perspective, in new kinds of institutions that better express how universal those first few paragraphs of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence really were.

2.

Nobody in Charge

THE "OUTSIDE WORLD" to which we are reawakening after our long preoccupation with Vietnam, Watergate, stagflation, abortion, busing, welfare, and jobs now looks more than ever uneconomic, unjust, ungovernable, lawless, leaderless and lethal. As we enter, hopefully, some years of American self-renewal in an interdependent world, we can start from some near-certainties about it:

- It is, and will continue to be, a world with nobody in general charge. That is, of course, the way we Americans wanted it. We didn't want the Kaiser or Hitler or Stalin to be *über alles*—but we also didn't want to be global overseers ourselves. Through alliances and aid programs, we have done what no leading power in history has done—shared our power with others, tried to build up other nations and international agencies. Let's not be carried away with our own generosity, because it was really enlightened selfishness: we didn't want all those foreigners on our back. We wanted most of our brothers to keep themselves.

  We succeeded—too well, some would say. The world is not managed from Washington, or from anywhere else either.

- It is a world full of dangerous weapons. Nearly $300 billion of annual defense spending worldwide. Six nuclear weapons states (seven if you count Israel). Two dozen and more on the threshold, producing as a by-product of their energy programs the starting kit for several thousand Hiroshimas a year—if they wish. Massive trade in conventional arms, amounting to more than $20 billion last year—with American ingenuity and salesmanship accounting for more than half of that worldwide. An eerily stable strategic stalemate, based on the uncertainty of response combined with the certainty of enormous devastation if a nuclear response is provoked. An escalating capacity of smaller nations—and guerrilla groups, criminal conspiracies or lonely desperadoes—to make a less-than-global mess of the complexity we call civilization.

• The industrial democracies face a chronic crisis of governance—their leaders baffled by the dirt, danger and disaffection that urban systems seem to generate, their young people educated for non-existent jobs, their middle classes squeezed by inflation and harassed by bureaucracy, their farms and factories hosting an enormous migratory proletariat, their governments revolving in endless and ineffective coalitions.

• The Marxist societies also face a chronic crisis of governance—unable to plan for the succession of power, heavily dependent on military strength for internal stability and international clout, unable to maintain momentum for their kind of revolution in the developing world, unable in Russia's case even to feed their own people without depending on American farmers.

• The rich nations—and the rich people in the poor nations—face a global fairness revolution, multiplying the demands on a world economic system that knows how to include only a minority of mankind in its benefits. They face also a shredding of international law by those who think markets are unjustly rigged to favor the already favored, and a broken-down money system that fluctuates in response to speculative guesswork rather than to the meeting of human needs.

• The world population of four billion is already programmed to double in four decades. The world food situation—not yet organized enough to call it a system—is too dependent on the North American granary, which is in turn stuck with a hundred years of bias in favor of scarcity. The world energy economy still discourages plentiful coal and clean solar sources, draws down too fast on those petroleum molecules that are really too valuable and versatile to burn, and settles in desperation for the symbiotic spread of nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

• A hundred large transnational corporations provide much of the enterprise in world trade and investment, yet remain the most available villains in world politics. Transnational enterprise manages to solve many problems of communication, accountability and staffing which organizations tied to national governments still find baffling. The world of interdependence they serve and reflect has rewarded them with a rate of growth much more rapid than nation-bound business; more than one-fifth of what we learned in school to call "international trade" is now the *internal* transactions of international com-

panies. There is obviously much to be learned about international cooperation from their successes, and from their excesses too—and an international regulatory task ahead to reconcile their private purposes with their public responsibility.

• A growing number of operational functions—made both possible and necessary by scientific discovery and technological invention—simply cannot be contained in national decision systems. Picture-taking satellites and fast computers made it possible and thus necessary to treat the world's weather as a single global system; a World Weather Watch became a technological imperative, and the international control of weather modification had better be just around the corner. Satellite communication technology also required a global system; Intelsat was invented to match. Some forms of pollution are global; an Earthwatch system is being planned now by U.N. agencies. The oceans, where freedom for the technologically advanced is no longer seen as fair to all, badly need new laws to contain conflict, encourage conservation and promote research. The deep seabed, an international "commons", needs to be exploited under international auspices. And the fast-growing potential of remote sensors operating from space vehicles (the LANDSAT series, Space Shuttle, Spacelab and their eventual successors) opens up yet another opportunity for international effort in exploring for earth resources and monitoring deserts, crops and forests.

• The international organizations designed a generation ago by Atlantic leaders to govern the cooperation of all nations with each other show all the symptoms of multiple sclerosis. New technologies and weapons make nearly every human concern more international than it was before. But the institutions and instruments that reflect this *de facto* internationalism are so clearly no match for conflict, poverty and runaway systems that people in every nation display toward them a mixture of disinterest and disdain.

IN THE DECADE of the 1940s, a war-generated burst of creativity brought into being a cumulation of global, regional and functional international agencies for relief, collective security, technical

cooperation, development aid, and the regulation of trade and money. The Cold War soon overlaid the global structure with history's most extensive pattern of peacetime alliances and very large bilateral arrangements for economic and military aid.

The dominant mood in 1976, about this legacy of the 1940s, is disenchantment. American leaders can become instant heroes in U.S. domestic politics by expressing impatience with the U.N., annoyance with their allies, and ennui with foreign aid—though all three continue to enjoy majority support from the American people in public opinion polls. A semi-united Europe and an economically powerful Japan are still embarrassingly dependent on the U.S. for their security and on Middle Eastern monarchs and colonels for their energy. The Marxist rivals in Moscow and Peking agree on nothing except their nonparticipation in world institutions. And the developing nations of three continents find that bloc voting in global assemblies fails to improve the terms of trade, quicken the flow of aid, protect them from their neighbors, or give promise of avoiding a crisis of survival for millions of their citizens.

. . . a world in which rebellion in Chile can cause an assassination in Vienna, in which Turkish poppies can produce muggings in Montreal, in which industrial effluents in Detroit can cause cancer in Windsor, Ontario, in which crimes on Hawaii Five-O can stimulate recidivism in Boston . . .

Stephen Bailey, educator

The static charters and status-quo compacts of a quarter-century ago simply did not predict or provide for what we now regard as the prime issues in "harmonizing the actions of nations": managing interdependence, meeting basic human needs, promoting change and keeping change peaceful.

There is thus a long agenda of creative effort just ahead. Somehow the community of nations—or at least of those most concerned—will need to create a food reserve, assure energy supplies, depress fertility rates, stabilize commodity markets, protect the global environment, manage the ocean and its deep seabed, control the modification of weather at human command, rewrite the rules of trade and

investment, reform the monetary system, mediate disputes, reduce the cost of military stalemate, control conflict in a world of proliferating weapons, keep the peace when it is threatened and restore the peace when it is broken.

It is this impressive agenda, taken as a whole, that will amount to a third try at world order. It will not, this time, feature the creation of some new overarching world organization. Rather, it will be a variety of bargains, systems, and arrangements which reflect the paradox of world order—that there is no consensus to entrust any nation or race or creed or group with general responsibility for world governance, yet there is an urgent need to tackle problems which will yield only to world-scale solutions.

Last year an international working group assembled by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies studied the political economy of this new kind of world order, and called it a "planetary bargain":

> The complexity of the issues and the congestion of interest-groups involved (159 nation-states, a hundred major transnational corporations, dozens of nonprofit multinationals, all meeting in 700 intergovernmental conferences and more than 3,000 international association meetings a year) make nonsense of the notion that with one great political act a New International Economic Order might be created. The process, if it works, will be more like a global bazaar, in which negotiators are continuously engaged in parallel negotiations about strategically related but tactically separable matters. Yet the environment for constructive bargaining has to be created by a shared sense that bargains can be struck which advance the interests of all, that a political consensus can be formed by widespread realization that peoples of every race and nation are in dangerous passage together in a world of finite resources, ultimate weapons, and unmet requirements. It is the complex of principles, strategies, and institutional changes required to "get it all together" and serve human needs, that we call The Planetary Bargain.

Living in a world where nobody is in charge, but the United States of America always seems to get on the executive committee, will require of Americans some very special attitudes of mind and qualities of spirit. Later on in this essay, I will attempt to spell them out. But meanwhile, let's not take offense at the notion that

the third try at world order will be an exercise in the management of pluralism. Americans should find that congenial if any one does. Isn't that what James Madison was seeking to describe in Federalist No. 10? And isn't it something like what we have been working at for 200 years in the United States, the nation with nobody in charge?

3.

Interdependence: A Question of Degree

INTERDEPENDENCE is a familiar but uncomfortable idea. In its simplest meaning, it is a condition not a theory, a "fact" not an ideology, a way of saying what all of us learn as part of growing up: that some relationships are inescapable, like having a brother who may get you in trouble but is still your brother.

In international relations, interdependence is technologically, economically, politically and morally inescapable: no nation can be wholly master of its own fate. Along with every one else in the world, Americans don't have to like it, but we do have to learn to live with it. So interdependence wins no popularity contests, here or abroad.

"A civilization," says Raymond Aron, "is usually composed of combative states or of a universal empire. . . ." But what we moderns have achieved, he adds, is much more complicated: ". . . quarreling states, more subjected to assymetric interdependence than they would like, . . . too different to agree, too interconnected to separate . . . ."

But as you look around the world you don't see nations acting as though their interconnectedness were inescapable:

- Nuclear weapons are the clearest present danger to mankind's survival. Yet those who already have more than they need are building yet more of them, and a number of those who don't have them are keeping open the option to build or acquire them.

- Irreversible damage to the biosphere is clearly possible. Yet industrial and urban polluters continue to soil the air and the seas, and a hundred nations yearn to industrialize and urbanize enough to add their fair share of pollutants to the global environment.

- There is a great deal of talk just now about meeting basic human needs. Yet international aid, investment and development strategies

still mostly help the rich and middle-income people in both "rich" and "poor" countries.

- A world food system needs surpluses from the North American granary. Yet farm subsidy programs in the U.S. and Canada still are best designed to prevent surpluses.

- Our interconnected world needs effective international organizations, especially to manage the transfer of resources from richer to poorer countries. Yet the poor-country majority has eroded the U.N.'s authority, torpedoed its taxing power, and rejected proposals for sharing revenues from the continental margins and the ocean floor.

- Transnational enterprise is still the most effective agent of technology transfer. Yet some growth-hungry host governments and job-hungry home governments are readier to denounce these transfers than to regulate them.

- Since 1971 the U.S. dollar has not been strong enough to be the "key currency" for the whole world. Yet progress toward creating a truly international money has been, to put it charitably, sluggish.

- And so on.

What's wrong with the picture? Evidently the interconnectedness of world society is only half the story. *Some* degree of interdependence *is* inescapable. But it is also true that each nation can, *within limits, choose* how dependent it wants to be on the actions of other nations, and how much it wants other nations to depend on its own national decisions. Interdependence is thus a *means* (to self-reliance, to freedom, to prosperity, to security, to the handling of problems too big for one nation to handle alone), not an *end.* Like the science and technology that make it possible, interdependence is not inherently a Good Thing or a Bad Thing; it is morally ambiguous. It can, for example, be a threat to security (Western Europe's dependence on Arab oil) or an enhancement of security (Western Europe's dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella).

In a world where nobody is in charge, each of the main actors—which are the governments of nation-states (including their publics when they are allowed to express their opinions), and a variety of transnational enterprises and associations—makes this choice in hun-

dreds of detailed decisions that together constitute the "fact" of interdependence at any one moment in time. Thus, for example, as of 1976:

• The United States has opted for an increased dependence on Middle Eastern leaders for energy—because it decided (by default) not to have a coherent national energy policy.

• The Soviet Union, by betting on heavy industry and failing to grow enough food, has opted to depend on North American farmers for adequate supplies of wheat.

• The People's Republic of China has chosen to be very selective in its interdependence—but Peking has made a $200,000,000 contract with the Kellogg Company to build some ultra-modern fertilizer plants in a hurry.

• Western Europe, by creating a Common Market, has opted for less economic dependence on America—while building its military defenses around the presence of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in Europe.

• Japan, by building a modern industrial state on islands with virtually no resources except highly educable people, has opted for an extreme dependence on unimpeded commerce and communications.

• Iran, by selling off its oil fast to build a modern industrial export industry, is making its future very dependent on the later willingness of other nations to permit access to their markets.

• The executives of some transnational companies, who are judged by short-term profit margins, are reducing where they can their investments in countries whose politics they judge to be unfriendly or unpredictable.

So it does not get us very far to say "interdependence is a fact." The *degree* of mutual dependence is not a given. It's an option, a choice, a "policy."

4.

INTERDEPENDENCE: WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT

FOUR BILLION PEOPLE so far share the globe's patronage, and its perils. It is human nature for each of them—and each of the nations into which they are divided—to seek the benefits of interdependence without its burdens. Each of us has grown up in a family circle, an ethnic group, a national society; our differing attitudes toward interdependence are formed by the differing ways in which we depend on others, and others depend on us.

Our Western European friends, for example, have grafted industrial technology onto long national traditions and self-confident cultures. After several centuries of intra-European conflict and extra-European conquest, they have achieved by cooperation (among themselves and with the United States) the longest period of peace since Charlemagne. European leaders typically learn several languages, appreciate a variety of cuisines, are at ease in international gatherings.

Europeans invented the freedoms—of the seas, of commerce, of exploitative investment—that gave their technological strength full play and linked them with the rest of the world, on European terms. But those links are the other name for dependency: Western Europe must lean on the rest of the world for much of its food, most of its markets for industrial exports, the bulk of its minerals and (except for the finds under the North Sea) nearly all of its oil.

The Japanese, who came later and more hurriedly to the Industrial Revolution, had almost nothing to work with except energetic people and a genius for organizational behavior; one expert refers to Japan as a "minerals museum," implying that it can find under its own soil about enough minerals to keep its museums supplied with rock samples. Yet by learning from experience the limits of independent action, they have managed to make interdependence the basis of an "economic miracle."

Interdependence has served the present industrial democracies well, and the notion that it must now be organized in wider, more consultative multilateral bargains creates less "culture shock" in Western Europe and Japan than elsewhere.

The history of the two great continental experiments with Communism is of course very different. To the Chinese, fending off or absorbing invaders through four millennia and more, the Middle Kingdom has always been the center of the world; in the traditional Chinese language the inhabitants of the rest of the world are "outer barbarians." A century of humiliating experience with colonial enclaves around China's coastline, and a decade of almost equally painful partnership with the Soviet Union, reinforced the rugged isolationism of a peasant-based revolution and predestined modern China to a policy of highly selective interdependence.

North and west of China another continental civilization also has a long history of centering the world on its own land mass. Under both imperial and Marxist czars, Russia has given priority to internal development and ground-based defense; the memory of Genghis Khan and the latter day pretensions to world revolution and a global navy are really exceptions to a more basic rule. The Soviets, like the Chinese, are selectively interdependent; but they have also bet much more heavily on heavy industry. Their anxiety to "catch up with America," combined with failures in farm policy, have produced a degree of dependence on the West for grains, computers, and advanced industrial machinery.

The Eastern European nations are held in an imperial embrace by tightly managed cooperation reinforced by military control. A top Romanian official at the Club of Rome meeting in Philadelphia last Spring said it wryly and succinctly: "The opposite of interdependence is not independence, but dependence."

AMONG THE DEVELOPING, ex-colonial peoples of South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, black Africa and Latin America, "interdependence" is still a touchy word, under suspicion as a new formula for enslaving them—with Western ("white," "gringo") economists and businessmen taking the place of the garrison troops and intervening Marines that are still remembered in living color.

Most Americans think the colonial era is history, and we tend to tune out the persistent anti-colonial rhetoric of Third World leaders. But that rhetoric is still an important fact of international life. If we had been listening in on the March 1976 Lima meeting of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, we would have heard a fiery opening speech by the Peruvian Foreign Minister, a string of denunciations of the way in which, he said, transnational enterprise had held back economic growth in the developing countries. Most Americans think these international companies, while perhaps too ready in the past to use bribes and pressure on their stockholders' behalf, are the best channel for the transfer of capital and technology to developing countries, needing only to be reined in by governments to enforce a code of public responsibility. But the Minister did not seem to have noticed any redeeming features. Transnational enterprise, he said, has exploited the economies, subverted the political systems, and violated the sovereignty of all developing countries, systematically, substantially, on purpose, for years and years. During the Lima meeting, multinational firms were repeatedly accused of using interdependence as a cloak for perpetuating *dependencia;* in this view poverty, not progress, is their most important product.

. . . they still very much fear what they call neocolonialism, that they are going to be exploited by multinational corporations, that interdependence is merely a code word of the developed countries to justify continuing to draw on their resources at an unfair price.

Charles Yost, diplomat

This is strong stuff, and there is lots more of it to be heard at almost any international meeting these days. The non-aligned countries, meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka in the summer of 1976, aligned themselves with similar sentiments. In many cases the rhetoric lags behind the reality: a good many nations—Brazil, Mexico, and the oil-rich members of OPEC are examples—are effectively regulating, or else eliminating, foreign investment from the exploitation of key natural resources. Moreover, the U.N. forums, like legislatures in our national and state capitals, have a language of their own, much of it addressed not to the problem at issue but to the folks back home. Nevertheless, the rhetoric does reflect pervasive

populist sentiments in the developing countries, which are shared by large numbers of people in the United States and other industrial democracies—and echoed, from a safe distance offstage, by the leaders of Communist-ruled nations. The rhetoric is itself part of the reality, and limits how far political leaders of developing nations can be seen to cooperate with the United States, which is the symbol of asymmetric interdependence.

Beyond the potent legacy of anti-colonial resentments, there is a growing conviction that even when the Americans and Europeans and Japanese *are* really trying to help, they don't know what to do and make a mess of it. A single example may stand as a prototype: the recent famine in the Sahel countries of Africa, it now appears, was primarily a man-made disaster, a catastrophe caused by good intentions.

The Sahel has a history of drought; a sparse, frugal, little developed population of nomads foraging over large areas. Then Western development came to help, and succeeded in improving health standards. There were now more people in the Sahel, with longer life spans; populations had to move farther and more often. There was also a certain improvement of consumption patterns, which meant more animals eating more of the crops. The animals, especially the goats, ate the plants down to the roots, the thinner plant-life produced weather changes, drought came, the wind blew away the top-soil. Famine became unavoidable. The result may have been more bitterness and misery than there would have been if the foreigners had stayed away altogether.

To the language of resentment and the disenchantment with "developed" wisdom is added now the prideful achievement of OPEC, which managed to prove that all of the dependence did not have to be on the side of the weaker nations. There has been much illusory extrapolation of the Arab oil embargo, among the producers of every commodity from bananas to zinc. But even though no more "OPECs" seem possible—no other case combines the geographic concentration of production, the absolute essentiality of the raw material, and the difficulty of substituting other materials without great expense and long delays—the oil producers' demonstration of "collective self-reliance" gave a psychological lift to the concept of Third

World solidarity. And that solidarity in turn persuaded the industrial democracies to come into negotiating range on a long list of bargaining topics being negotiated, beginning this year, in Paris, New York, Nairobi and elsewhere.

I once suggested to a Palestinian guerrilla that it was in his interest and mine for him to stop bombing supermarkets. I said, this does not play very well in the rest of the world. And he said, well, maybe not in your world, but my world starts in Morocco and goes across into Pakistan, and it plays very well.

Jon Vondracek, communications specialist

To the Third World, and to "Third Worlders" in the politics of the Atlantic and Pacific democracies, interdependence is far from a "fact" to be passively accepted. It is, rather, a form of *dependencia* to be converted, by struggle and shouting and hard-nosed negotiation, into two-way bargains with enough equity and dignity on both sides to prove that the colonial era is really past.

WHAT THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT members of the world community are discovering, of course, is what the founders of the American Republic also had to learn from hard experience: that the next step after a declaration of independence is the management of interdependence.

If we look into our own heritage for clues to our national self-renewal in an interdependent world, the central paradox is obvious enough: In the colonial and founding eras, our political leaders understood interdependence very well indeed. But in the ensuing century and a quarter, from 1815 to 1940, the most powerful forces in American life and politics were domestic, isolating, inward-looking.

The Spirit of 1776 was not only universal in its idealism but interdependent in its struggle for independence. Most of the important resolutions in the Continental Congress, the movements of

Washington's army, and the nation's early problems of trade and finance had important international dimensions. Would Canada or Ireland join in the revolt against Britain? Would the French fleet arrive at the right place in time to insure victory? Would the Spanish act against English garrisons in Florida or would her colonies also seek independence? Would liberal, possibly revolutionary movements in Flanders or Geneva or Sweden emulate the American Revolution? Would Holland or France loan hard currency to America?

From their first foundation the English colonies of North America were faced with destruction or takeover by foreign powers; and in the forty years following the Declaration of Independence the nation's fate rested squarely upon its foreign relations. The need for the French Alliance in 1778 and the very real fear of national strangulation posed by the Spanish retrocession of Louisiana to Napoleon in 1800 were but the most urgent of the foreign entanglements of the founding era. Until 1815 the British colonies and then the new United States were (as we might say it today) preoccupied with "Atlantic relations"—as a matter of life or death.

Ideological concerns were as wide as the geopolitical ones. As the colonists evolved their demand for the "rights of Englishmen" into declarations of the natural rights of man, they "joined the world" in their revolutionary idealism. Paine and Jefferson derived their political thought from Aristotle, Milton, Locke, Montesquieu, and other giants of Western thought, and each wrote in language designed to appeal to "all Men."

The importance of international affairs is evident in the careers of all American presidents before Jackson (except Washington). Each of them had either served in important diplomatic missions abroad (Jefferson, Monroe, and both Adamses) or been, as Madison was, a foreign policy specialist within the Continental Congress. Each had also served as Secretary of State before becoming President—if one counts John Adams' leadership of a Continental Congress committee on foreign correspondence as equivalent to that office. Each was fluent in at least one foreign language, a learned student of world history, and something of an expert on what there was of international law. In contrast, only two subsequent Presidents

came from the State Department, and until the mid-twentieth century only one other President had a notable concern for international affairs before entering office. The exceptions prove the rule: Martin Van Buren served as Secretary of State almost solely to manage Jacksonian patronage, James Buchanan had no discernible effect on American foreign relations, and Herbert Hoover had been a foreign relief operator, not an analyst or philosopher of international politics.

After 1815, fearing no foreign power and able (like the Japan of today) to get away with minimal defense spending, the United States was free to develop its rugged individualism under the tacit protection of the Royal Navy. The important moments in our international relations in the century after 1815 must in retrospect be classified as cheap shots: the Monroe Doctrine, the wars of 1846-47 and 1898, the opening of Japan, the purchase of Alaska, the frightening of France out of Mexico, the Open Door in China, the arbitration of the Russo-Japanese War, the takeover of Hawaii, the various expeditionary adventures in Latin America. Even the successful (and costly) intervention in the First World War was a belated decision by a very independent United States to take part in somebody else's war.

Meanwhile, behind the screen of low-cost security, Americans were busy at home, settling new land and developing the qualities of enterprise, self-reliance and pragmatism to match. The cowboy, the prospector, the pioneer, the small-time entrepreneur and the city booster became the prototype Americans—and as models they influenced millions of people who never had firsthand experience with the frontier.

The most important happening in "foreign relations" during this time was the arrival in the United States of more than thirty million immigrants, one of the largest voluntary migrations of peoples in human history. The immigrant, who was another kind of frontiersman, also thought of the future as in his own hands. The earlier immigrants, now "native Americans," met only those foreigners who wanted to be Americans—a dubious training for getting along later with those who did not. The focus of American life was internal, the purpose of politics was to keep the government from inhibiting the release of individual energies.

From Jackson at least through McKinley the spirit of the nation was stongly laissez-faire. It is here that in order to prosper and fulfill the nation's destiny, which was growth, the government was called upon to promote and protect enterprise—through tariffs, cheap labor (by liberal immigration), land grants and subsidies of many kinds. But the private development of transportation, utilities and natural resources, the emphasis on state and local government, no federal banking system, no trained civil service, the glorification of entrepreneurial ingenuity and the heedlessness of social costs of enterprise all helped create an environment of struggle in which the fittest got rich and the poor were by Darwinian definition unfit. But the idea of individualism, self-help, and private initiative also created a vibrant diversity that was enormously rewarding to millions of individuals and powered the world's most successful "developing nation."

This century and a quarter of success in isolation, this profound experience of real-life independence from events in the rest of the world, covers more than half of our national history; small wonder that it spawned an ideology that still has its sentimental echoes in present-day politics ("Get the U.S. out of the U.N. and the U.N. out of the U.S."). But ever since Hitler's armies appeared on the English Channel in May 1940, and especially after the Second World War left the United States—for a time—as the world's only superpower, the question has been not whether to be interdependent, but how to handle our inescapable relationships.

Even so, the manner of our emergence misled us about the nature of interdependence. American economic dynamism, military strength, cultural vigor and political imagination helped create a very interdependent world but a very asymmetric one. Others seemed to need our nuclear protection, our weapons, our food, our science and technology, our university degrees, our loans and grants, our movies and television programs, and our political leadership—and we didn't see ourselves as needing much from them except willing cooperation in our plans for world order.

The real relationships have never been as one-sided as that, of course. Our nuclear preeminence began with experts and expertise from Europe. Our energy comes increasingly from the Middle East. We import large proportions of many key minerals we must have to keep going, including tin, chromium, bauxite, manganese, nickel, zinc,

and lead. The very definition of our "high" standard of consumption is the variety of things and the diversity of culture we buy from abroad. Our farms and industries are critically dependent on easy access to overseas markets under reasonably predictable conditions.

Still, most of us, if we thought about it at all, have until recently considered interdependence as a Good Thing because we didn't think of it as dependence on others for anything we really had to have.

It was the Arab embargo, of course, which brought us up short—short of oil and also short of doctrine for the era of "world order politics" so suddenly upon us. As we look back to our history for guidance, we will do well to regard our long period of "splendid isolation" as an aberration, and return as a norm to the idea the founders started with 200 years ago: to seek our independence through the astute management of interdependence.

5.

INTERDEPENDENCE: THE LABYRINTH OF MANKIND

WHAT LIMITS the sliding scale of choices about interdependence? Why can't any nation—however isolated, however powerful, however reluctant about "entangling alliances"—just stop the world and get off? The reason, like the question, is a cliché: the world is round, crowded, shrinking. Everything is related to everything else. Communication is global, the environment is a unity, inflation is indivisible, war anywhere is worry everywhere.

The elements of world affairs are often discussed as though they were separable "problems" that will yield to separate "solutions." But the paradox of our time is that in everything we undertake, the bottleneck is somehow the situation as a whole.

Our problem is not usually the absence of specialized knowledge. We know a great deal about nuclear weapons, arms sales, poverty, affluence, environmental impacts, man-made dangers and resource constraints. We sense that present trends, without conscious intervention to harness Man's runaway power to a restraining purpose, could extrapolate to catastrophe. We are only just beginning to see that all these well-researched "problems" are so exquisitely tangled together that action on any one of them requires thinking about all of them—that is, thinking about the whole predicament. Nobody is trained to do this; no university offers a Ph.D. in "getting it all together." Yet that skill is now required of literally millions of us—leaders in one way or another in a many-centered world.

> **Once you see that the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone and the thigh bone is connected to the hip bone, you can no longer pretend that they are separate. And if you are going to make them work, you're going to have to deal with them in combination.**
>
> **Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce**

"We Mexicans," says the poet Octavio Paz, "have always lived on the periphery of history. Now the center or nucleus of world society has disintegrated and everyone—including the European and the North American—is a peripheral being. We are living on the margin . . . because there is no longer any center. . . . World history has become everyone's task and our own labyrinth is the labyrinth of all mankind."

IT IS PROBABLY no coincidence that "world history has become everyone's task" just when the general public has discovered ecology, the science of mutual relations between organisms and their environment. The worldview of politicians, philosophers and people of affairs does seem, at least in modern times, to derive from the discoveries and speculations of scientists.

It was not until Isaac Newton had pictured the universe as guided by precise laws of motion, tending to harmonize the forces of nature, that John Locke found in "laws of nature" the only foundations for human society, Adam Smith (*The Wealth of Nations* also had its 200th birthday in 1976) discovered an "invisible hand" to guide trade and industry according to the (natural) law of supply and demand, and James Madison wrote that a balance among "factions" might, like the counterpoise of heavenly bodies, provide a democracy with built-in self-control. The Jeffersonian model for a republic with its reasonable, self-reliant citizens, its orderly and effective institutions and its "mild" government was thoroughly Newtonian in spirit and conception.

Charles Darwin's theory of natural evolution (*The Origin of Species* was published in 1859) made room for an alternative worldview, in which unpremeditated struggle, wasteful and chaotic, eliminated the unfit and replaced order and reason as the central dynamic of Nature. "Social Darwinism" soon followed, prescribing competitive struggle as the new law of nature, justifying waste and selfishness as possibly useful agents for determining the "fitter" inventions, mores, institutions, and individual leaders.

In the twentieth century the popularization of Albert Einstein's thinking and the revolutionary notion that matter and energy were interchangeable, once again produced their social fallout. Inspired by the word "relativity" if not by its abstruse mathematics, the idea that "everything is relative" undermined organized religion and made it quite respectable to believe that eternal verities might well be proven wrong by further study— the student meanwhile suspending judgment on whatever he might earlier have learned at home, in church or at school. The global spread of social relativity may even have contributed to the growing conviction, in colonial and underdeveloped lands, that the self-evident principles by which the suppression of subject peoples had been justified and their resources appropriated might in a new worldview prove unjustifiable.

Beginning in the 1960s, a new sort of outlook has emerged from the profound discoveries of the life sciences (the cracking of genetic codes, the study of what goes on inside a cell, the deciphering of food-climate-population-energy puzzles), symbolized by the astonishingly sudden popularity of the term "ecology." Ecological science directs our attention to the way varieties of life relate to each other and to the environmental "support systems" that make life possible. The key word, parallel to *harmony, struggle* and *relativity* in the earlier cosmologies, might indeed be *interdependence.*

In a luminous essay about the "vibes" cells give to each other, Lewis Thomas observes that in order to sustain life, "using one signal or another, each form of life announces its proximity to the others around it, setting limits on encroachment or spreading welcome to potential symbionts." Even the earth itself might be thought of as an "immense organism" where "chemical signals might serve the function of global hormones, keeping balance and symmetry in the operation of various interrelated working parts, informing tissues in the vegetation of the Alps about the state of eels in the Sargasso Sea, by long interminable relays of interconnected messages between all kinds of other creatures."

Every branch of the ecological sciences—including studies of weather, the oceans, the atmosphere, the ozone layer and the like—sends a supporting message: we had better respond together to Nature's "global hormones" that give us signals of life or death. We "interdepend" or perish.

The intuition of some social observers has been producing parallel messages for several decades past. Long before ecology was paperback fare, Lewis Mumford wrote lucidly about the need for "organic growth" in our cities and the shortcomings of mere competition or material increment as policy guides. Literary voices from D. H. Lawrence to Solzhenitsyn have given us poignant visions of what industry and bureaucracy can lead to if divorced from a concern for human consequences. The yearnings of the young for a more "natural" life, musings about the greening of America, and appeals from non-Western thinkers for some alternative to mindless economic growth, all carried clues to the defects of "modernization." The message was given wide currency by ardent scientist-proponents like Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner, and was recently reinforced in the second report to The Club of Rome, *Mankind at the Turning Point.* In that report, computer models that assume autarchic or retaliatory responses to food or energy or raw material problems by nations or even regional groupings lead quickly to catastrophic trouble. But if policies of global cooperation are assumed, comparatively humane solutions become possible.

IT IS HARD to draw a picture of a labyrinth when you are inside it, looking for the exit. Yet that is the critical assignment for our generation, so let us try to illustrate the emerging ethic of ecology. Essentially what we are beginning to perceive is an interlocking system of limits—not "limits to growth" but limits to thoughtlessness, unfairness, and conflict (Figure 1).

In one dimension, the "rich-poor" or "North-South" axis, an emerging ethic of fairness suggests a limit (A) to poverty, a minimum entitlement to human needs merely by virtue of being born into the family of Man; and also a limit (B) to the share which the most affluent person takes from a pool of resources which is flexible but finite. (The principle is familiar, even if the practice is uneven, in the progressive income tax.)

Fig. 1

The Emerging Ethic of Ecology



In other dimensions, an emerging ethic of prudence suggests socially-determined limits (C) to the damage people should do to their physical environment (air and water pollution, stripping of the land, thinning of the ozone shield); (D) to the dangers inherent in people-managed processes (family planning decisions, nuclear power plants, chemical reactions, traffic accidents, weather modification, genetic engineering); (E) to the rate at which people use up non-renewable resources (fossil fuels, hard minerals); and (F) to practices that affect the renewability of renewable resources (soil erosion, destruction of wildlife, overcropping of farmland, overcutting of forests, overfishing of lakes and oceans).

Still another dimension (G) limits the scale of conflict about limits. Shortages and the desperation and rivalries they intensify will provoke acute conflicts. The arms available for use in these conflicts, which are not only the conventional and nuclear instruments of frightfulness but also economic and monetary and psychological and chemical and biological and meteorological weapons, will no longer be in the hands of an oligopoly of so-called "powers." The nuclear technologies especially give everyone a common stake in limiting the extension of politics by military means. Factions and nations and regional or ideological blocs are going to have to bargain with each other to stay within limits (A) through (F) without the option of turning to the nuclear weaponeers as a last resort, because that resort is too liable to be the last.

OUR ARGUMENT so far is this. In a dangerous and determinedly pluralistic world, interdependence is here to stay; is to some extent a matter of choice; is regarded very differently by different peoples according to their differing historical experience; and must be thought of, and acted on, ecologically, which is to say as a whole.

Not "first we have to do this . . ." *but* "first we have to do everything . . ."

Robert Neumann, political scientist and diplomat

The agenda for a third try at world order is so various—a variety of subjects, a variety of "actors", a variety of negotiations and bargains among them—that no person can presume to a thorough understanding of them all. Yet as residents of a country with a global reach, and also citizens of a polity where ultimately the people make the policy, individual Americans do have to try to cope in their own thinking with the whole complexity at once. So we owe it to ourselves, and to the role we are destined (like it or not) to play in the politics of world order, to translate interdependence from a fashionable if controversial symbol into an agenda for action. The agenda is discussed in the next four chapters. It consists essentially of:

• Measures to moderate the three world weapons races, and make it less likely the weapons will be used (Chapter 6);

• Measures to stay inside the ecological limits; to promote fairer bargains about what is produced and who gets it (a "new international economic order"); and to handle internationally those problems and technologies that are inherently global (Chapter 7); and

• Organizing to handle the new agenda—among nations (Chapter 8) and within the United States (Chapter 9).

As we take inventory of the trees, the whole forest had better stay in view. For whatever international actions Americans take must proceed from a worldview that is true to ourselves, that matches our own idea of what it is to be American, and what we are trying to do in the world.

6.

THE THIRD TRY: BEYOND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

THERE WAS an intriguing press release this summer about a Government pamphlet on "Safety." It dealt with beef cattle, but its platitudes for tomorrow's farmers have a wider application, beyond the cattle guards.

"The best way to not have an accident," says this pamphlet, "is to prevent it. . . . Hazards," it says, "are one of the main causes of accidents. . . . Be patient, talk softly around the cows. . . . When you are working around wastes, you need plenty of fresh air. . . . Be careful that you do not fall into the manure pits."

It seems unlikely that anyone who has lived on a farm needs this excellent advice, but the architects of world security would do well to heed it. Military affairs, too, are hazardous, and the best way not to have an accident *is* to prevent it. Soft and patient talk is the essence of arms control. And we have not yet found the right manure pits for our radioactive wastes.

The most hazardous paradox in world affairs is easy enough to describe. Nearly everybody says that military force is no longer the preeminent form of power, that oil power and food power and the power of ethnic ties and social example and political ideas are front and center on the world's stage. The United States recently completed in Vietnam a ten-year demonstration of this new truism. Yet the world is spending around $300,000,000,000, or close to one-twentieth of the gross world product, on its armed forces this year, and military spending is still going up each year. National leaders are still so preoccupied with national security that they can muster neither the imagination nor the resources to fulfill the main purpose of governance, which is to enable the people they govern to meet their basic human needs. And three arms races—for more and better strategic weapons, for the capacity to produce nuclear exposions, and for "conventional" (but more and more sophisticated and expensive) arms—are very nearly out of control.

. . . man's age-old effort to defend his own by massing on the frontier . . . [has] been liquidated in space. Now of course most people don't know it yet . . . The fact remains that substantially we all share the same atmosphere today, and we can only save ourselves by saving other people also. There is no longer a contradiction between patriotism and concern for the world such as there inevitably was when your feet were on the ground and that was all the ground you had.

Margaret Mead, anthropologist

The men (and very few women) who wrote the antiwar rules of the League of Nations and the United Nations were trying to build clubs that would outlaw "aggression." The vision of the Covenant and the Charter was to get away from balance-of-power politics, which was seen as having twice led to world war. The idea was called "collective security", but the authors of the 1919 Covenant and the 1945 Charter were still fighting the last wars, and could not foresee the various kinds of peace that would in fact need to be preserved.

The essence of a balance of power was supposed to be that no nation could rationally calculate that it would win if it commenced hostilities. The *certainty* of effective resistance was the deterrent. Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler both calculated the Allies would be weak and divided, so aggression was calculated to pay. The First and Second World Wars, we could see later, came about because the willingness to use power was no longer in balance.

We haven't had a Third World War in the thirty-one years since the second one ended, but that is not due to "collective security" in the U.N. Charter sense. It is the consequence of a new kind of balance of power—different in two fundamental ways from the old kind that held things together in Europe between 1815 and 1914. The differences are both due to the quantum leap from gunpowder and TNT to nuclear fission and fusion.

One difference is that multiplied *uncertainty* is now the major deterrent to big wars. Even those who have deployed vast armories of nuclear weapons, impressive in their variety and unimaginable in their explosive power, do not have a clear idea how they might be used in a real-life conflict. If those who hold these arms at the ready are thus unsure, no military strategist on the other side can tell his

political leader to proceed in the face of such weapons with confidence that something called "victory" is certain, or even meaningful. The sure benefits of strategic warfare are declining, while its conceivable costs are on a sharply rising curve. The "calculated risk" has become incalculable.

The other difference from earlier times is that the nuclear weapons states do not seem in practice to be able to use the full range of their power in small-power disputes. In the period since the Second World War, this factor may well have increased the incidence of "small" wars, of which there have been half a hundred since 1945. Only in two cases, Korea and Vietnam, has a superpower involved its own troops directly in a regional military conflict, and the exceptions are instructive: we settled for stalemate in one case and withdrawal in the other.

FOR THE BETTER PART of three decades the most stable element in world affairs has been the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union—and its younger brother, the stalemate in Europe between the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. The stalemates work despite the dynamics of strategic technology—because both sides work hard at weapons research and development.

There is now bipartisan agreement in the United States on the proposition that in the age of overkill we don't need to be No. 1, we just need to be tied for the gold medal. For some years there has been evidence of a steady increase in the numbers and quality of Soviet strategic missiles. The Soviets vowed after the 1962 missile crisis to "catch up with America" (Kuznetsov said as much to John J. McCloy as they sat on a fence in rural Long Island negotiating about Cuba that autumn) and despite all the talk about arms control they have in effect done so. Teng Hsiao-ping, when he was acting premier in Peking, summarized the record severely but accurately: There have been several meetings on strategic arms limitation, he said to a visiting American delegation, and after each one "the polar bear" has caught up some more.

The calculus of equivalency, between baskets containing such different varieties of statistical fruit, is an analytical nightmare. The

United States clearly has the lead in yield-to-weight ratio, but the Soviets have bigger boosters. The Soviets are still behind in accuracy, but are ahead in hardening missile sites and protecting command and control. In defensive systems, the first SALT (for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement restrained large installations like our Safeguard and the ABM deployment around Moscow. But the so-called anti-tactical missiles, developments from surface-to-air technology, are not limited by any agreement so (contrary to popular belief) there can still be something of an arms race in defensive systems too. In anti-submarine warfare, the United States is ahead in acoustic means, but the Soviets are vigorously exploring (as we are) the non-acoustic means of detection. In bombers, the United States still has both a quantitative and qualitative lead; but part of a bomber's effectiveness is its "stand-off" capacity—how far it can throw how accurate a weapon—and the rapid improvement in long-flying airborne weapons, including cruise missiles, may reduce the margin of advantage in bomber aircraft as such. If we deploy the cruise missile, the Soviets will have something else to catch up with.

Since the year after the Cuba missile crisis the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating seriously, if sluggishly, about nuclear weapons. The first step was to constrain nuclear testing—banned now in the air, at sea and in outer space, but still permitted (within a limit of 150 kilotons, more than ten times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb) underground. The next step was to put a ceiling on the deployment of strategic weapons. SALT I stopped anti-missile systems (ABMs) on the rationale that if either nation could really protect itself from nuclear attack, the uncertainty about the other's response (which is the deterrent) would disappear. In averting a costly and self-defeating ABM race, SALT I ratified deterrence. SALT II, the Vladivostok agreement, reached for a rough equality—shifting away from troublesome numerical inequalities in the SALT I accord. Even the Vladivostok "agreement in principle" on very high ceilings has not yet been confirmed; it has been mired in detailed non-agreement for two years. ("Agreement in principle" is diplomatese for "We haven't agreed yet, but we want to announce an agreement anyway.")

Both American political parties agree now on "rough equivalency" as a strategic posture and on detente as an inescapable

policy—if we define detente not as relaxation, but as the continuation of tension by other means. We cannot get on with disarmament except by agreement with the Russians; we have our own hangups in reaching such an agreement, but the resistance to arms control inside the Soviet government is probably a good deal stronger than in ours. No American President or Congress can fail to keep trying for agreement, and meantime to maintain the "rough equivalency" by mounting a high-priority weapons research and development effort. The first commandment of peace is to keep the military stalemate stale, and the second commandment is like unto it: to increase stability and reduce the cost of peace through arms control.

The pattern is clear. No net advantage can long be preserved by *either* side . . . The long leadtimes for the deployment of modern weapons should always permit countermeasures to be taken. If both sides remain vigilant, neither side will be able to reduce the effects of a counterblow against it to acceptable levels. Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons ignore these facts and the real choices facing modern leaders.

Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State

Almost as stable as the strategic arms race is the stalemate in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Again the comparison is a complex and partly intuitive calculation—how do you balance Pact superiority in numbers of tanks against the superior quantity and quality of NATO military aircraft?—yet deterrence in Central Europe has worked well enough to divert the Kremlin toward flanking moves in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and (combined with other factors) to encourage bolder political action by the no-longer-dependable Communist parties of Western Europe. But here too the effort to convert military stalemate into an arms control agreement has run into trouble. Negotiations about Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), which date from a NATO consensus at a Reykjavik meeting in 1968, are still stalled in 1976 at interminable meetings in Vienna.

Contrary to earlier fears and fantasies, however, the long process of making peace with the Soviet Union has not destroyed—though it

has strained—the Western unity on which a viable stalemate depended. Indeed the North Atlantic Council, which used to be essentially the board of directors of a military alliance, has over the past decade become also a continuous caucus on how to make peace with the Russians.

The global confrontation of U.S. and Soviet naval forces cannot be pronounced stable; yet it is not quite as dynamic as it looked a few years ago. After the Red Navy abandoned its earlier modest slogan ("Handmaiden of the Red Army") for more global ambitions ("To be at sea is to be at home"), the U.S. Navy watched in apprehension as the Soviets built their capacity to operate for very long periods in any ocean, while the American forces were strapped by tighter budgeting and interservice rivalry. But there seems to be some limit to the Soviet Navy's capacity to get the funds to build new and better ships, and the United States still has the option to make its forces go further by eliminating some of the rigid agreements that tie up ships in areas where they have primarily symbolic value. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet navy can now blow the other out of the water. Maybe we are coming close to the time when an arms-control approach could also be applied to blue-water forces.

THE GREATEST UNCERTAINTIES in the nuclear balance may result from multiplying the number of nuclear-weapons states. The dynamic factor here is not Soviet actions but the widespread development of nuclear energy for power production, abetted by the salesmanship of the United States and its European and Canadian allies.

Since 1954 an average of one country a year has "gone nuclear" for the production of power. Some of these decisions result from promises that if governments would forswear nuclear weapons by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, assistance would be forthcoming from the existing nuclear powers for the development of peaceful uses of the atom.

But it is not all that easy to assure that nuclear energy for power does not lead to nuclear energy for weapons. If present schedules hold, by the early 1980s the spent fuel from the operations of installed nuclear reactors could produce enough plutonium to make several thousands (one estimate is 10,000) nuclear weapons a year.

Some countries (Brazil, Pakistan) have already shown signs of wanting to parlay nuclear power programs into nuclear weapons potential. Before long a couple of dozen countries will be able—whenever they (or their constitutional or *coup d'état* successors) decide it serves their perceived national interest—to brandish nuclear weapons, or (in cases like Israel, where it's too dangerous to detonate a symbolic test explosion) brandish the ready potential to produce nuclear weapons. Even today, according to one estimate, more than thirty countries are in a position one way or another to lay their hands on weapons-grade fuel—and from that point on the task of making a workable (not necessarily a very efficient) bomb is generally regarded as not too difficult.

Two decades ago, only an optimist would have predicted the slow growth of nuclear weapons proliferation to date: only one new country per decade has detonated a test bomb. The complex attempt to slow the spread of nuclear weapons includes the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the recently agreed nuclear suppliers' guidelines, and increased international opposition to new nuclear-sensitive facilities such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

All this effort has certainly succeeded in sensitizing non-nuclear weapons states to the dangers of "going nuclear." Yet there remains a widely-held impression that having nuclear weapons causes a nation's voice to be heard more effectively in world affairs. The detonation of test weapons has certainly worked that way for the People's Republic of China, and has probably worked that way for France. India made a similar wager, but it is not at all clear that India's voice is stronger, either within the Third World or in global politics, than it was before its 1974 detonation.

Without an observable test, the known potential to "go nuclear" is part of Israel's arsenal of deterrence. Even the first-stage investment toward a nuclear weapons program can sometimes be cashed for advance political dividends. Brazil recently arranged to buy from the Federal Republic of Germany nuclear reprocessing equipment (the bridge from nuclear energy for power to nuclear energy for weapons) and shortly thereafter the U. S. Secretary of State visited Brazil to arrange for regular political talks to parallel the practice of consultation with European allies and Japan. Other nations that are thinking about "going nuclear" are not likely to believe that the timing was coincidence—even if it was.

Things have already gone so far that the making of public policy on this subject can no longer properly be called "non-proliferation;" a more descriptive phrase would be "the management of a world in which the capacity to make nuclear weapons is readily available and widely spread."

Note that what is spreading fast is not the stockpiling of nuclear bombs but the *capacity* to develop them in a hurry (a few days, a few weeks, a few months at most). Thomas Schelling points out that in this sense the U. S. Army "has" the bow and arrow in its weapons inventory, whether or not it has ready bows and arrows stored in a military arsenal, because the nation it serves knows how to make bows and arrows suddenly if they are needed. Switzerland "has" an army in the same sense: hundreds of thousands of trained civilians will ride to their posts on bicycles within a few hours of a mobilization call. In this sense of establishing a mobilization base to make or acquire their own nuclear weaponry, rather than of stockpiling weapons, it is predictable that several dozen countries will "have" nuclear weapons before long.

The biggest factor in spreading nuclear mobilization bases so fast is the development of nuclear power. As of March 31, 1976, thirty-one countries other than the United States had made commitments to build 292 nuclear power reactors—of which about half are in various stages of design and construction, or already built. Seventeen countries other than the United States are already generating electricity from nuclear energy.

As everyone knows by now, a major byproduct of nuclear fission in a power reactor is spent fuel rods that contain plutonium. There is still a lively argument among the technicians as to whether a bright graduate student, working in a well-equipped basement, can get the plutonium out of the nuclear waste, and make a bomb out of it. But no one seems to doubt that this is within the capability of a national government which sets its mind to the task. The same will likely be true, within a decade or less, of uranium enrichment, the other route to the manufacture of weapons-grade fuel; new ways of cracking radioisotopes with laser beams may soon speed up the spread of uranium enrichment by reducing its cost.

What spreads this technology is the almost universal assumption, based mostly on the energy policies of the United States, Canada,

and their European allies, that there is no alternative to permanent reliance on nuclear power to meet the world's growing energy needs. But atomic power *could* be seen as a nuclear parenthesis between fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas) and forms of energy now regarded as exotic but which may be economical within a generation or two (solar, geothermal, wind, and especially bioconversion). Looked at this way, the best way to reduce the spread of nuclear power technology would be to shorten the parenthesis by working hard at developing alternative sources of energy—and cut down on the wasteful use of the energy we are already using. Meanwhile, during the generation or two of the nuclear parenthesis, we should try hard to help the countries that don't yet have weapons to get assured supplies of reactor fuel without having to make their own—because making their own fuel is the stepping stone to making their own weapons.

Winston Churchill captured in a vivid phrase, "two scorpions in a bottle", the essence of two-nation nuclear deterrence; Robert McNamara, while he was still Secretary of Defense, called strategic war a "mutual suicide pact." Nobody has yet found the phrase to describe so graphically a larger bottle containing scorpions by the dozen, of assorted sizes and sensitivities. It is not impossible that the caution induced by nuclear weaponry, which has certainly been a striking feature of big-power politics during the generation just past, presages an equivalent prudence by regional powers which will acquire or produce nuclear arms. Whatever we can do to increase that caution, by educating people about the almost incredible destructive power of nuclear explosives and not threatening to use them ourselves when we know they are essentially unusable, we ought to do. But it is obviously a great deal safer to reduce their spread than to arrange for their non-use.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS and nuclear proliferation are at least a topic of arms-control discussion. But in the case of "conventional" arms no serious arms-control efforts have been proposed. Buyers and sellers perceive a common interest in this thriving trade. The bystanders who might get caught in the cross-fire have had no standing in the processes of decision.

In the past three decades the United States has transferred some $110 billion of weapons and military services; that is more than half the world total. In 1967 the flow of our foreign military sales and military assistance grants was down to $1 billion; growing demand from newly affluent countries, and the U.S. Government's push to improve its balance of payments, drove that figure up to $11.5 billion in 1974, out of a world total of about $20 billion. U.S. sales are down to an estimated $8.3 billion in 1976. Even with the recent decline, these military transfers have thus increased eightfold in eight years.

Military aid is down to a trickle now: 97 percent of this year's arms transfers are sales by the government and by private enterprise. Some of the selling has been very enterprising indeed, and has accounted for some of the juiciest cases of bribery and corruption which have hit the headlines and embarrassed several friendly governments in recent years.

The argument for each arms deal is usually strong. It helps our allies contribute to the mutual defense; it is a substitute for what would otherwise be a continuing U.S. security commitment; it helps us moderate the behavior of military-led governments (of which there are many); it helps preserve a regional deterrence system (sometimes that means we are on both sides of a local arms race, as in the Persian Gulf); it helps maintain internal security (Korea, the Philippines, Ethiopia); it constitutes a politically symbolic act (Egypt); it helps carry the research and development costs of weapons our own forces are also going to use; and besides, if we don't get the business, somebody else will. (Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, who has made himself something of a specialist on arms-control issues, calls this "the most vexing argument." It reminds him, he says, "of a fellow I knew in the Army who cheated at cards; he said if he didn't get their money someone else would.")

Even if the case for selling arms seems strong in each particular case, the net effect of all the cases together is grotesque: the United States has become overwhelmingly the chief pusher of these addictive commodities. Our national interest not only does not require us to take on such a role; it requires that we look more carefully at arrangements which lead to deeper involvement than we originally had in mind (Vietnam in the past, and perhaps the Persian Gulf in the future), and which do not effectively retain for the United States any

control over what is done with the weapons we provide (the lesson learned from both Turkey and Greece in the Cyprus crisis).

Congress, which has found in foreign arms sales a safe and productive quarrel to pick with the Executive Branch, has been chipping away at Executive discretion in this area—by requiring that Congress be notified of any sale more than $7 million, which it can then veto if it acts within 30 days; and by separating military aid from economic development assistance, to make it easier to zero in on the military relationships. But trying to restrain individual transactions is an unsatisfactory response to a major policy issue.

The central problem is that the United States has not had an arms sales policy, except perhaps to maximize sales for balance-of-payments reasons. It is high time to relate arms sales to our national interests and our sense of what a system of world order requires. That means providing arms where we would be willing to follow up with fuller support in an emergency (Europe, Israel, Korea), and watching very carefully the commitments that are implicit in sales to countries which are, in the end, going to have to work out their own problems in their own regions. It also means trying hard to develop an international system of control over arms transfers, beginning with our allies and including the Soviets and other suppliers. What is good for the global narcotics trade is good for the global arms race.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS may in time find their way into the hands of nongovernmental organizations, or guerrillas, terrorists, pirates, desperadoes. Very large explosions have not yet played an important part in the history of guerrilla activity; the largest terrorist detonation of record seems to have been the device that blew up the mathematics laboratory on the University of Wisconsin campus, and that was about two tons of TNT. Terrorists thus have a long way to go with conventional means before they need even a one-kiloton explosion.

Terrorists and organized guerrilla groups are bound to be somewhat deterred by the uncertainties involved in using an untried technology to pressure an international assembly, raid a national treasury,

or spring fellow-terrorists from prison. Nevertheless, the present level of terrorist activity, and the vulnerability of urban industrial society to the desperado willing to destroy himself, require a growing investment in security arrangements which restrict the freedom of individuals inside countries, and necessitate tighter forms of international cooperation.

The Barbary pirates molested shipping without fear of the consequences until all ports, including those on the Barbary Coast, were closed to them. Most of the contemporary terrorist scenarios seem to involve using the mass media to project their threats and propaganda, then getting an aircraft and flying to a friendly airport. Those options can realistically be closed off, because in most countries both the mass media and access to airports are centrally administered by government agencies, and in the others they are subject to regulation and open to persuasion. An effective denial of attention and airport access worldwide could raise the risks of modern piracy enough to be a real deterrent. (Castro's unsympathetic treatment of hijackers seems to have eliminated Havana as a highjacker destination.) But that will require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation which may not be possible until more terrorist acts have enhanced the incentive to cooperate.

EVEN UNDER the most favorable assumptions about arms control, the international tensions over rights and requirements will not go away; they are likely to increase as the developing countries push for more fairness and larger transfers of resources, and more powerful military governments throw their weight around in their own regions. The net effect of modern weaponry is already to increase the capacity of "weaker" countries (and nongovernmental organizations) for non-nuclear violence. This is not only because nuclear weapons are turning out to be unusable in most if not all international conflicts. It is also because the so-called "conventional" weapons are becoming so much more effective. In a future "Angola", for example, cruise missiles might neutralize naval support of ground operations. In future "Pueblo" or "Mayaguez" incidents, small but determined governments may have precision-guided munitions which enormously increase the accuracy of non-nuclear violence.

We are playing chicken with history and we've lost once already.

Jeffrey Race, scholar

One group that assembled this year in Philadelphia, under the leadership of the International Peace Academy, summed up the unappetizing prospect this way:

> . . . The trends toward escalating violent conflicts are aggravated by the increasing economic and political tensions over resources, food, communications development and human rights as well as the availability of sophisticated technology, capable of mass destruction, to terrorist groups. . . . Specific additional developments such as satellite propaganda broadcasting, weather modification, and atmosphere or ocean pollution create new human problems and may provide impetus for severe violent international conflicts. Intra-state and regional conflicts will increasingly drive, rather than follow, global conflicts between the superpowers. It appears that intra-state conflicts will be the leading contributor to inter-state conflicts in the decade ahead. Interdependence-related issues will fuel such conflicts.

The world community is shockingly unready to deal with this state of affairs. It even lacks applicable doctrine or theory with which to think about it. The inherited theories of Clausewitz and Mahan, the definitions of "aggression" by the U.N.'s Legal Committee, the concentration of writings on strategic nuclear war, are very little help. Nor is there international machinery that seems to work.

The U.N. Security Council is charged with the maintenance of peace and security, and may prove to be a precious asset for mobilizing international peacekeepers. But with a few exceptions (the U.N. force in the Congo, the 1967 resolution on the basis for an Arab-Israel settlement, and the consensus on a Rhodesian boycott are notable cases of constructive grappling with difficult issues), the Security Council is wedded to resolutions of the "let's you and him agree to something, anything" variety. Moreover, the Security Council has never had an effective international planning staff, trained and mandated to do objective policy analysis.

Still, the Security Council is a useful centerpiece for a system that tries to keep change peaceful. As a permanent member of the Council, whose assent is required for it to act, the United States is well placed to take initiative in this area. There is growing evidence that the Soviets are willing to support a broader role for the Security Council—and that the Chinese have so far been willing to let that happen, though with little input on their part.

Properly staffed, the Security Council could go beyond its present mode of meeting only for crisis management in an emergency, and develop a conflict prevention program:

• Most conflicts can be seen coming, and should be surfaced for international consideration while they are in the incipient stage. As with cancer or the common cold, it helps to apply remedies early.

• "Third persons"—individual mediators, single nations or small committees of nations to provide good offices from a neutral corner, arbitrators, election supervisors, observer teams, communication facilities—should be identified by the Council ahead of time, already recruited and available for sudden peacemaking services. (They do not need to be on a permanent staff; mostly they would be individuals or groups with international standing, but with alternative assignments or professions in their own countries.) The function has in recent years been dramatized by the "shuttle diplomacy" of Henry Kissinger in the Middle East and Southern Africa. But the U.S. Government will not always, or even usually, be the right "third person"; it is often better not to engage so directly the national commitments and personal prestige of a big-power representative; and anyway, the Secretary of State can't do *everything*.

• Modern communications, which can increase international damage if misused, also have the potential for increasing the effectiveness of international peacemaking and peacekeeping. Instantaneous multichannel communication by satellite makes it possible to bring a local conflict, even in a "remote" region, to world attention overnight. Conferencing by satellite makes possible a new dimension in crisis management. Broadcasting from satellites may have a peacemaking role. Speedy consultation with a "community of the concerned" can certainly be facilitated. And response time in the command and control of international peacekeeping forces can be greatly reduced.

• Judging from a score of past cases peacekeeping forces are useful in direct proportion not to their size, but to their ability to get there fast, their readiness to act, the speed of their communications, their sensitivity to local conditions, and the backing they get from their sponsors (the Security Council or a "consortium of the concerned" acting in its stead). It is essential that some peacekeepers be at the ready all the time, and that national forces be trained for readiness to participate quickly as international "soldiers without enemies." A world that can find a billion dollars a day for war in the Middle East in 1973 can scrape together $140 million a year for international peacekeeping in 1976.

IN A WORLD full of dangerous weapons and unusable military power, the control of arms by agreement cannot be an afterthought, or delegated to a specialized agency of government. The United States, as "the fat boy in the canoe," is in a position to take a strong lead in reversing the direction of all three arms races by:

• downgrading the usability of nuclear weapons;

• pressing hard and imaginatively for actual reductions in nuclear warheads and strategic delivery systems—and getting the rest of the world to help break down Soviet reluctance to get on with arms control (but that means we have to mean it ourselves);

• retarding the proliferation of nuclear "mobilization bases" by shortening the "nuclear parenthesis" in the development of future energy supplies;

• recognizing that a good many countries will soon be at or near the point of "going nuclear", and working to educate leaders of non-nuclear weapons states about the dangers and difficulties of nuclear war-making;

• taking a fresh look at arms sales policy, developing first a U.S. policy that brings sales within the perimeter of our own national interest, and then pressing for parallel policies with other supplies (as is being done on nuclear exports through the "London group");

• pressing for a world-wide agreement to deny terrorists the means of communication and transportation; and

• helping to beef up the U.N.'s capacity to provide "third parties" for peacemaking and international units for peacekeeping.

7.

THE THIRD TRY: GROWTH WITH FAIRNESS

IF THE GENERAL PEACE can somehow be kept—and what other assumption makes sense?—the rest of world-order politics is how to organize a process of planetary bargaining about the prudent use of resources, the production and distribution of wealth, and the management of global systems. The bargainers will be shifting casts of "actors", but Americans and their government are bound to appear in every act. That is why it's useful for us to review the whole plot as the on-stage posturing begins.

The essence of the story will be the maturing of the next great world movement, a *global fairness revolution.* It has been preceded most recently by the Renaissance and the Reformation, the industrial revolution, and the revolutions of national independence, starting with ours. It coincides with vertiginous changes in scientific discovery and technological innovation, which are producing the first experiments in "post-industrial" or "information" societies. It vies for attention with a continuing superpower rivalry, with open competition and close alliances among the industrial democracies, and with old-fashioned power politics between and among neighbors in every world region.

But I think it is a reasonable guess that the global push for fairer distribution of worldly goods will be on center stage the most insistently, the most often, and (if ignored or underrated) the most dangerously.

Until the mid-1960s U.S. priorities in international politics were clear enough: "East-West" relations (deterrence and detente between the two superpowers and their allies) came first. Relations among the industrial democracies (the Atlantic alliance, European integration, and later the growing relationship with Japan, Australia and New Zealand) was second. "North-South" relations (the issues between the industrial and developing nations) were the subject of desultory public debate and modest foreign-aid spending, but rated only third-place attention.

Now, a decade later, it is almost equally clear that "North-South" relations have overtaken the other two big foreign-policy concerns. Indeed, more and more of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and with our Atlantic and Pacific allies will be "driven," as the International Peace Academy committee suggests, by rapid changes and persistent pressures from *and within* the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Even the Soviet-Chinese rivalry is an aspect of the larger falling out between the world's "North" and "South."

Samuel Gompers spoke of "Fair shares of bread, peace, and freedom."

William Doherty, labor leader

The world will still spend most of its defense budget on the big-power stalemate. The industrial countries will still do most of the world's business. But it seems likely that most of the troubles, disruptions, terrorism and small wars will stem from the demand by the other two-thirds of the world for a fairer shake. To take only one example, 80 percent of what transnational enterprises do is done in industrial countries; but it's the other 20 percent of their business that is attracting most of the noise, most of the meetings about codes of conduct, tax policy and employment effects, and nearly all of the attention from the U.N. Commission on multinational corporations.

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THE CLAIM that poverty is still the world's most pervasive affliction can no longer be doubted. The claim that something should be done about it is morally unassailable. What is in doubt is the will to make the revolutionary reforms *inside* the developing nations that a serious attack on world poverty requires.

Much of the problem has been obscured by the way we talk and write about it. Most politicians in the poor countries (themselves usually affluent, at least in government perquisites) and most economists in the rich countries have been content to discuss poverty as if nations, not people, were poor. The favored analytical tool has been per capita gross national product (GNP), an average which

obscures all the really interesting questions about the distribution of wealth and income inside each country. As Charles Yost says, "GNP is a peculiarly undiscriminating indicator. . . . Like Oscar Wilde's definition of a cynic, it knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. It is true to its name—it is gross."

In the decade of the Sixties the developing countries as a group increased their combined GNP by nearly 5 percent a year—"the highest sustained rate of economic growth for any group of countries in history and substantially more rapid than the growth of presently industrialized societies at comparable stages of development." Half of this increase was soaked up in population growth of 2.5 percent. The other half seems to have gone to the more affluent "middle-class" countries in the group, and to the upper and middle income classes inside the poorest countries. It now appears that, if you leave out the statistical enigma of China, there are more poor people in the world by any measure you choose—malnutrition, mortality rates, literacy—than there were before the postwar development aid policies were invented.

A study of 43 developing countries found that the poorest 60 percent of their people received only 26 percent of their national income—and that the distribution of income in the countries rich in natural resources tended to be a good deal worse than in the others. In 1950 the world's population included 700 million illiterate adults; in 1970 that number had increased to 783 million despite a well-advertised campaign by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to "eradicate" illiteracy. (The proportion of women among the illiterates also rose sharply, from 40% to 60%, during this period, which is one of many indicators that the poverty load is carried disproportionately by the female half of the population.)

Nor has the picture changed in the 1970s, so far. In a statement to his Board of Governors in October 1976, President Robert McNamara of the World Bank divided the nations into "developed," "middle-income" and "poorest". The poorest nations, those with per capita incomes of less than $200 a year, contain 1,200,000,000 people. Between 1965 and 1975 their average incomes grew at an annual rate of only 1.5% or about $2 per year. "And for tens of millions of individuals in these countries at the lower end of the income spectrum their already sub-standard levels of nutrition, hous-

ing, health and literacy deteriorated even further. These societies have been unable to meet even the minimum human needs of the vast majority of their people. The middle-income developing nations [those with per capita incomes of more than $200] have done considerably better. As a group, they have achieved an overall growth rate for the decade of 6.8%—about 4% in per capita terms. . . . For the poorest countries, the outlook is bleak: a projected per capita growth rate [to 1985] of no more than 1 or at best 2% per year. . . . Even if by an extraordinary effort per capita growth rates could be expanded beyond 2%—and that itself is doubtful—it might well mean little or no real alleviation of absolute poverty. Growth in the gross national product, as essential as it is, cannot benefit the poor unless it reaches the poor. It does not reach most of them now by any meaningful measure."

70% of the world's population do not have an assured water supply.

Edward P. Morgan, journalist

This means, McNamara added, for many millions of people "a set of squalid and degraded circumstances almost beyond the power of our sophisticated imaginations and privileged circumstances to conceive. . . . Compared to those fortunate enough to live in the developed countries, individuals in the poorest nations have

- An infant mortality rate eight times higher;

- A life expectancy one-third lower;

- An adult literacy rate 60% less;

- A nutritional level, for one out of every two in the population, below minimum acceptable standards; and for millions of infants, less protein than is sufficient to permit optimum development of the brain.

This is what absolute poverty means for some 750 million human beings in these nations. . . ."

It is easier to be sorry than to be wise about this state of affairs. The World Bank, which has been trying hard to reorient its program toward the poorest of the poor, still has to sell its bonds on the financial markets, and is still lending most of its money to the "middle-class" countries most likely to pay it back. The U.S. Congress has recently been adding anti-poverty riders to the annual foreign-aid legislation. But the distribution of benefits inside developing nations is mostly a matter of internal reforms, which is to say their own sovereign decisions. Many development planners, especially those who have studied (often in U.S. graduate schools) the history of industrialization in the West, think it is inevitable for income disparities to increase for a while in the early stages of rapid economic growth. "We've noticed that whenever a country industrializes, the rich-poor gap gets worse before it gets better," an economist in a Middle Eastern country told me last year. "Our gap is growing, so we're just where we would expect to be on the curve."

Meanwhile, the growing scandal of world poverty is probably reducing the incentive in the industrial democracies to help. (The Soviets and their allies have mostly opted out of international cooperation for development, on the convenient ground that the ex-colonial powers owe the developing countries aid as an act of contrition and reparation.) A global war on poverty seems altogether too vast an enterprise; the unemployed and the families in our ghettos should have priority; and anyway why should the poor in the rich countries help the rich in the poor countries? Despite a multilateral commitment in the United Nations to try to transfer 0.7% of industrial-nation GNP to developing nations in government grants and loans, the United States with 0.23% of GNP in 1975 is now twelfth out of seventeen on the list of contributors to "overseas development assistance."

In the diagram about ecological limits in Chapter 5, a limit to poverty came first, and not by accident. During the past year the idea has spread that the meeting of minimum human needs—that is, a direct attack on "absolute poverty"—should somehow become a first charge on the world's resources. The international working group that outlined a "planetary bargain" for the Aspen Institute last year proposed that "the time has come to relate international economic arrangements to the meeting of basic human needs."

What seems to be required is a system for establishing and reviewing international standards for individual entitlement to food, health, education, and any other agreed components of "minimum needs;" and for relating international economic cooperation, including aid, to progress toward such standards.

The instinctive objection, particularly from affluent elites in the "poor nations", is that any international pressure to do something about poverty inside their own borders would violate their new-found national sovereignty. In the flush of just-won independence, that is a powerful objection indeed. But if the contributing countries cannot get their own people to support measures to help the "poor nations" because the help somehow winds up in the hands of an affluent urban minority, then some device will have to be found to reassure the contributors without intervening in the internal affairs of the recipients. There are, of course, precedents. When (in 1948) the United States tossed to the European countries the task of dividing up the Marshall Plan aid, the Europeans empowered their recipients' club, the OEEC, to hold hearings in which each European country came up with its national economic plans and request for U.S. aid, and the other European countries probed and questioned and criticized—and even got some changes made in national plans. Even today, the procedure for seeking stabilization assistance from the International Monetary Fund involves submitting to the IMF a rather full analysis of a nation's economic prospects and monetary policies—and standing still for unsolicited advice from the other IMF members and the organization's professional staff.

An identifiably American proposal, no matter how well intentioned, would be viewed with suspicion in the current atmosphere of "North-South" confrontation. But some method will surely have to be found to make the meeting of basic human needs, as defined in consultation with the needy, a central purpose of a New International Economic Order. Because otherwise, the relations between the industrial democracies and the developing countries will keep tripping over the objection that international help for development is not trickling down to the poor.

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LET US ASSUME not only that the peace is kept but that the world community is able to agree on enough priority for basic human needs to unleash the productive energies of the world's poor and unlock the political will of the rich to tackle the whole "fairness" agenda. That agenda is complex, extensive, and in its details very technical. But for our present purpose, which is to suggest how Americans can cope with interdependence and why they should, it may be enough to sketch in the tasks ahead and comment on how the "North-South" debate is going.

For an American, the primary task has to be the dynamic and prudent management of our own economy so that it makes possible an expanding world economy able to meet human needs without transgressing the biosphere's ecological "limits."

Americans still produce, and also consume, more than one-third of the world's product; it is still true that an economic sneeze in the U.S. may result in anything from a heavy cold to acute pneumonia in other continents. An overwhelming share of the world's research and development is done in the United States, and by American global companies. Most major new technologies—in such fields as nuclear power, space applications, military weaponry, petrochemicals, computer hardware and software, biological medicine, dryland farming, weather forecasting, and mass communication—get their start in our huge flexible, adaptive, enterprising economy.

There is no reason whatever for Americans to feel guilty about this industrial and economic preeminence. It has been brought about by betting on higher education, rewarding enterprise, welcoming immigrants (more in our earlier history than now), exercising a special talent for the management of large-scale organizations—and by the dumb luck of finding a wealthy, nearly empty continent to develop. But we do have to feel a special sense of responsibility for the health of the world economy (which is harder and harder to distinguish from our own economic well-being), and conduct ourselves accordingly.

World trade cannot be open and expanding (which helps us and others too) if the U.S. economy stagnates with 7 to 9 percent unemployment. A world food reserve is impossible to build or maintain if U.S. agricultural subsidies are geared not to promote surpluses but to guarantee scarcity. The average American uses twice as much

energy to achieve roughly the same standard of living as the average West German; it will be hard for other countries—and ourselves—to make safe and sensible energy choices as long as we are so profligate.

Others will have to do their part in fashioning a world economy that marries growth to fairness. But the U.S. economy is so large a part of the picture that we can never simply wait for someone else to move. It is always our turn too.

What is true of the United States alone is even more true of the industrial democracies as a group. They are two-thirds of world production, trade and investment. Especially with the Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China, for differing reasons, opting out of the new international economic order, the industrial democracies together influence most of the new order's crucial decisions by what they do themselves: how far they go in opening their markets and stabilizing commodity prices, how fast they permit the world's money supply to grow (which helps determine what the rate of inflation will be in every country), whose resources will be transferred to which developing countries for what development purposes, and how those transfers will be tied to the meeting of human needs.

A system of alliances (NATO, ANZUS, and the security treaty with Japan) that started for military reasons is needed just as much now as a political and economic policy caucus. Consulting with others about "our own" policies is often annoying and sometimes a bore. But in our great Atlantic and Pacific relationships it is also a must—in order to glue together the democratic world (which also happens, by no accident, to be most of the industrial world) for the planetary bargaining process, and most of all to improve the quality of U.S. "domestic economic policies" which are, like it or not, the vitals of "international economic order."

ALL PARTIES TO THE DEBATE about a new international economic order now agree that the present order is not working well. It fails to deliver equity to some, and it fails to produce a reasonably predictable business environment for others. Inflation and recession have more and more become global afflictions as countries export

their booms and busts. Arrangements about money and exchange are in rapid transition, but with no agreement about the direction of change.

Industrial democracies and developing nations, trying to cope, are responding in fundamentally different ways. The industrial nations have taken a Band-Aid approach, shoring up the old order by marginal changes to mollify its most insistent critics. The developing nations contend that even where the market system does work, it is rigged against them. The unfairness is structural, they say, and nothing short of major surgery will do. That's what they *say;* what they mostly *do* is to buy the marginal changes for lack of a better option.

The prescription for the surgery is contained in a rhetorical but important Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted by the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in the Fall of 1974. (The United States delegation went along with adopting the Declaration by consensus, then took exception to large chunks of it.) It is essentially a summary statement of the Third World position: The gap between rich and poor nations will continue to widen because economic growth in the developing countries depends on (1) stable prices for commodity exports, (2) access to industrial-nation markets, (3) expansion of production for export, (4) a just relationship (that is, a "link") between the prices of what they import and the prices of what they export, (5) access to international credit, (6) access to increased development aid, (7) access to technology, and (8) regulation of transnational corporations. Until these somewhat one-sided changes are brought about, the developing nations say, they will be handicapped in their development efforts in trying to support 70 percent of the world's population with 30 percent of the world's resources.

This doctrine was pushed through the U.N. meeting (and with variations has been pressed in resolutions and "action programs" of other global conferences) by an impressively solid political bloc, which is still nicknamed the "Group of 77" though its membership in any global meeting now runs to more than 100. In order to achieve bloc action, the drafters of resolutions for the "77" naturally leave out divisive themes. They treat all developing countries as "poor", even if a number of them are rich in oil, like Saudi Arabia

and Kuwait, or growing fast as "middle-class" countries, like Brazil and Mexico, or both, like Iran and Venezuela. They avoid mentioning the rich-poor gap *inside* countries; it remains for the American president of an international bank to raise that embarrassing question. They stay away from the population problem (some even claim that the rich-poor gap has more to do with overconsumption by Western babies than overproduction of poor-country babies). And they usually forget to mention that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have an obligation to help.

Nevertheless the Group of 77 has set the agenda for the reform of the international economic system. In 1964 the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was the only forum they controlled. Today, they can pass resolutions at will in the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and U.N. conferences on special subjects (food, population, women, human settlements). Only in the operating agencies, where nothing happens unless there is some agreement between the world's "North" and "South", is there yet a practical bargaining process; that's why the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Committee on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC, the Paris talks), and the Law of the Sea Conference produce fewer headlines and the prospect of more action. Still, the developing nations' caucus has had the initiative; the Communists have been sitting it out; and the industrial democracies play (in greater or lesser degree) the role of defenders of the market system.

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THE THIRD WORLD is well organized to do rhetorical battle; but when it comes to practical bargaining, the economic cost of political solidarity is high, and could get a lot higher. The obvious case is the devastating effect of the hike in oil prices on the balance of payments, and therefore the development plans, of the poorest 40 nations—not only India and Bangladesh, but two dozen African nations and others that together make up the resource-poor majority of the "77." Oil prices have been very damaging, also, to the more "successful" developing nations that do not happen to produce oil. In fact, the increase in the developing nations' bill for oil imports almost exactly offsets the aid they were getting from the industrial democracies.

Now the oil embargo and price rise is the first case in which a country or group of countries which were considered part of the developing world have imposed their will on us . . . that is why the countries hurt badly by the oil price have still stood with the OPEC countries and been unwilling to criticize them publicly. It was the first victory for "our team", for "our family", in a power struggle.

Edwin Martin, economist and diplomat

Two other cases, less well known but at least as significant, illustrate the propensity of the developing-nation majority to act together politically against the economic interests of most of its members.

A curious feature of Law-of-the-Sea politics has been the degree to which the land-locked and shelf-locked nations—50 of the U.N.'s 144 members—are mesmerized by their coastal brethren. If a 200-mile "exclusive economic zone" is generally adopted, that will cover some 40 percent of the ocean. And that's where the action is: 10 percent of gas and 20 percent of oil already in world production, moving to perhaps 50 percent in another generation; the bulk of the fisheries; nearly all the aquaculture potential; most of the scientific research; all of the shipping ports and sheltered anchorages; and the most sensitive national security considerations. The two countries which would benefit most are probably Canada and the United States.

Why do the land-locked and shelf-locked nations, most of them "less developed" and some of them very poor, want the coastal states —some of them very large and comparatively very rich—to reap the economic benefits that will accrue from exploiting the oceans and the ocean bottom 200 miles out?

In 1970 the United States proposed a draft treaty which would have provided for really substantial revenue-sharing from exploitation of the deep ocean floor and the outer continental margin. The eventual return from these new sources, especially from oil and gas, may well be counted in the billions of dollars. The idea was that a big slice of these revenues would become available for financing economic development in the poorer countries. Yet the "Group

of 77" rejected this proposal, apparently because of its American sponsorship; the offer, which had powerful opponents within the U.S. Government, was subsequently withdrawn.

That means that monies which could have been devoted to international purposes are now likely to accrue mostly to affluent coastal nations and those industrial powers (the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and the Soviet Union, and a very few others) with the advanced marine technologies to drill for oil and gas and mine the seabed minerals on their own initiative and authority. The developing-country bloc would be well advised to take a fresh look at this idea before it is too late—if it isn't too late already.

The developing-nations bloc has also been insisting, in U.N. debates and elsewhere, on rigid rules of national sovereignty over natural resources. The historical reasons for this insistence, the resentment of colonial preemption of their land and labor, are thoroughly understandable. But they are also thoroughly dated.

A study of where future minerals and metals are likely to be found reveals that (except for the oceans) the favored expanses of resource-rich territory are already under the sovereign control of a very few nations with the most square kilometers of the world's surface—the United States, Canada, Brazil, the Soviet Union, South Africa, Australia, Indonesia, and China. The forward-looking interest of most geographically smaller countries would clearly be to maximize international jurisdiction over (and therefore their own participation in decisions about) the key world resources they will *need,* but do not *own,* for their own development—oil, coal, iron, copper, uranium, manganese, nickel, and the rest. Yet "sovereignty over natural resources"—a doctrine which, looking ahead, will heavily benefit a few nations—is still the battle-cry of the many.

Those who now control these non-renewable minerals, and those with the greatest capacity to produce renewable riches such as food and fiber, are prone to regard them as "gifts from God". That is how the Iranian planners describe their great storehouse of oil and natural gas. In the United States our national hymn similarly implies that our "waving fields of grain" are the consequence of God's grace especially shed on America.

The gifts of abundance scattered so unevenly on and under the earth's surface, and in and under the oceans, are certainly gifts *from* God. But does it follow that they are gifts *to* the people who happen as of 1976 to have conquered or inherited them? The "77" have not raised the question.

IT IS IN THE INTEREST of the industrial democracies to be negotiating with a "trade union of the developing countries" that can clearly analyze and skillfully defend its abiding interests. The alternatives are much less attractive: a rash of "wildcat strikes" or a disguised re-enactment of the colonial relationship, in which benefits to the developing countries depend more on our analysis of their interests than theirs. That is too fragile and corruptible a relationship on which to build a planetary bargain.

The bargaining between the industrial democracies and the developing nations will center around six issues:

• Access. Industrial nations need sure access to oil and other raw materials essential to the maintenance of an industrial economy. Developing nations need food, and access to industrial-nation markets for their raw materials and their growing variety of manufactured goods.

• Stability. Industrial nations want stable prices for oil and other raw materials; developing nations want stable food prices and a stable relationship (sometimes called "indexation") between their export and import prices. Beyond this, the industrial nations (and their transnational enterprises) want international peace, and a reasonable predictability in the behavior of nation-states.

• Fairness. Industrial nations want the developing "South" to assume a measure of responsibility for the international system—to pitch in and make it work, not demonstrate across the street. Developing nations have been expressing a different view of fairness, measured not by obligations but by rights. When a Mexican initiative called the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted in the U.N. General Assembly over American and other in-

dustrial-nation objections, a European summed up the debate in one short sentence. "It's a Charter of their rights and our duties," he said.

• Resources. Industrial nations, which use the lion's share of the world's resources, want to balance resource use, growth rates and population growth in order to minimize adverse environmental effects and sustain the earth's carrying capacity. Some developing countries are experimenting with alternative paths to development—though the resource-wasteful, polluting, but rapid Western and Japanese industrialization process remains the favored development model. (In one international meeting on environmental protection, an African delegate interrupted with a phrase which has become a classic: "If industrialization means pollution, let's pollute!")

> **. . . we are witnessing a landing of three billion persons on this planet. They come by day, by night, one by one, two by two, or three by three. . . . they are landing everywhere, particularly in the developing countries. If they would land from the planet Mars, it would make great news in the newspaper. But they land from this planet and remain unnoticed.**
>
> **Bernard Chatel, scientist**

• Population. Industrial-nation analysts are mostly persuaded that poverty is partly a function of the growing number of mouths to feed—and that population control through family planning is therefore imperative. Developing-nation planners are more inclined to think that smaller families will tend to result from higher rates of economic growth—and cite, as Exhibit A, the declining fertility rates in most industrial nations. A way of reconciling these contrasting concepts may be to focus in the first instance on basic human needs, as the Aspen international workshop suggested:

> Family planning is an important *means* to the goal of meeting minimum human needs, which can obviously be more fully achieved in societies where the rate of growth of population is not excessive. But if family planning is not a goal, it is a fundamental right. It is important in itself to establish and protect the

right of individuals and couples to decide how many children to have. Food, health and education; a sense of growing material achievement; and the availability of modern contraceptive information and technologies, will together establish and maintain this right.

• People. Industrial nations are beginning to insist that their development aid reach the poorest of the poor—which would, for example, rule out the distribution of international development by automatic formula, a notion pushed hard by the "Group of 77." The governing groups in some developing countries have other priorities—heavy industry, urban development, a strong export sector, a big military buildup. Other developing-nation planners share the growing international interest in basic human needs, but face difficult trade-offs in allocating scarce resources between industrial and agricultural production, between investment in immediately productive capital and "spreading poverty" through social services such as education, health care and housing.

The ultimate outcome of planetary bargaining between the world's "South" and the world's "North" depends on many factors: how well each of the two main caucuses—the "Group of 77" and the industrial democracies—stick together, the quality of the "homework" they do, political developments inside each participating nation, the degree of participation by Communist-led nations, the actions of speculators on commodity and money markets, the presence or absence of effective "third parties" to help the negotiations along, the presence or absence of wars and rumors of wars.

The tone of the dialogue has certainly changed during the past two years, especially after the United States (in Secretary Kissinger's speech to the United Nations on September 1st, 1975) came into negotiating range. The content of what is going to be negotiated is still very fluid. New issues are still being introduced: "meeting basic human needs", and "collective self-reliance" (the code word for developing countries helping each other in practical ways), are new concepts just now emerging as factors in the "North-South" parleys. The hard bargaining on specific issues is still ahead.

— • —

THE THIRD TRY at world order emerges, then, as a creative surge of pluralistic institution-building in a world where no nation or alliance can call the new tune and write the new rules. It will have to be a dynamic peace system that preserves most of the existing forms of international cooperation and builds out from them in performing three kinds of functions.

One aim of international action will have to be *an interlocking series of systems to make sure mankind as a whole stays well inside the seven "limits"* suggested by the diagram in Chapter 5. (The capital letters key to the diagram.)

A. A system for establishing and reviewing international standards for individual entitlement to food, health, education, and any other agreed components of "minimum human needs;" and for relating international economic cooperation, including aid, to progress toward these standards.

B. A system for international review and monitoring of national decisions about growth, affluence and waste in the more developed countries.

C. A system that negotiates and monitors agreed standards of air and water quality, and reviews national actions that pollute beyond national frontiers.

D. A system that keeps under review the damage and potential damage from man-made processes, and blows the whistle on those that may affect people beyond national frontiers.

E. A system that promotes exploration for, and keeps a world inventory of, nonrenewable resources that may be needed by people outside the nations where the resources happen to be found.

F. A system that monitors world production of food and fibers; seeks international agreement to limit overcropping, overgrazing, overcutting and overfishing; and provides for the exchange of timely information on national harvests and food requirements.

G. A system that limits conflict by international conciliation and mediation, the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and (through arms control) the institutionalization of military uncertainty at the lowest possible cost.

Second: Beyond international attention to the sevenfold limits, there are functions which require new or adapted international institutions, to create agreed frameworks for planetary bargaining.

We can no longer be world policemen, but we may have to be global lawyers.

Adam Yarmolinsky, lawyer and professor

Among the most urgent systems waiting to be born are those needed:

• *To hold, finance, and manage buffer stocks of major world commodities,* assuring continuity of supply and price stability for producers and consumers in relation to long-term market forces. Where *price* stabilization won't work, it may be possible to stabilize *earnings* through supplementary loans and grants. But it will also be important to help raw material producers diversify out of dependence on one or two cash crops.

• *To ensure access by developing countries to markets in the industrial countries.* The World Bank says that annual foreign exchange earnings by the developing countries could be $33 billion greater by 1985 if all barriers to their exports were removed by the industrial countries. No other single measure would do as much for the achievement of "growth with fairness." The key problem here, of course, is the willingness of business and labor in the industrial nations to shift to the kinds of production that a free trade policy would require. The internal traumas involved might be overcome if (a) the industrial nations act together, (b) their governments are willing to invest in large-scale readjustment aid to their affected industries, and (c) the developing nations are seen to be willing, in return for market access, to be bound by agreed rules for trade and investment, to guarantee access to raw materials and to walk away from their own protectionist policies that impede their own economic growth.

• *To help manage constructive shifts in industrial geography* (for example, doing more processing of raw materials in the country of

origin), and help nations plan investment in their own industries in the light of investment policies of other nations. Developing nations are, without examining each other's plans, collectively planning for future exports which may well exceed, in some sectors greatly exceed, the likely future world requirements for imports.

• *To push agricultural productivity in the developing nations, and meanwhile to make sure there is enough food for all through a world food reserve* (for which the North American granary is bound to be the key source of supply during the next few years).

The essence of the world food crisis is suggested by one sobering statistic of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization: that if present trends continue, food-deficit developing countries will have to import more than 100 million tons of grain by 1985; that would cost more than $20 billion a year at current prices. Food transfers on that scale could not be paid for by the developing nations, and would not be provided free by the grain-exporting nations; moreover, food deficits on such a scale would raise food prices, in the U.S. and elsewhere, to the political boiling point.

The industrial democracies and the oil-rich OPEC nations have every interest in helping finance research and investment in better farming methods, irrigation, fertilizer, farm machinery and rural transport systems in developing countries. The developing nations, in their turn, will need to take steps—in most cases long-overdue steps—to make their agriculture more productive: land reform, price incentives to farmers to grow food, more and better agricultural credit and extension services.

• *To promote cooperation between oil producers and consumers, to reduce energy waste in industrial societies, and assist developing countries in devising sound energy policies.* Together with other industrial nations and the OPEC members, the United States can deploy capital and technology in the development of the abundant oil, coal and other energy resources of the developing world, with special emphasis on "natural energy" technologies—solar, wind, bioconversion—that are especially suitable for tropical rural areas. The developing nations, on their side, will need to adopt energy-saving and labor-using strategies, and encourage foreign enterprises in the search for new energy sources. (The Soviet Union, now the

world's largest oil producer with vast reserves of fossil fuels, could also make a contribution to world energy balance by welcoming joint ventures with the industrial democracies to develop its resources. But that will require a prior Soviet decision to join the world economy, and the rest of us cannot wait around for that.)

• *To resolve differences among transnational enterprises, host countries and home countries over such issues as taxation, employment, competitive practices and contributions to meeting basic human needs.* The very rapid growth of transnational enterprise is tapering off; regulation by host countries (notably the OPEC nations, the Andean Group, Brazil, and Mexico) is becoming much more effective; tax authorities and organized labor in the home countries are moving in on the transnationals; and their own executives are pulling in their horns (in recent months Atlantic Richfield Oil Co. has sold ARCO Canada and announced its intention to acquire Anaconda, which had already abandoned its troublesome earlier multinational role). Some of the heat may therefore go out of this issue.

The U.N. has set as a priority a universal code of conduct, which the Third World majority would wish to make mandatory. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the industrial-nation caucus, has adopted (June 1976) guidelines for transnational enterprises and related governmental decisions. But these are unlikely to be accepted in global forums, partly because they place obligations on governments as well as firms. In any event, the experience with written codes is that they are so specific as to be unworkable or so general as to be meaningless. It seems more likely that "North-South" bargaining on transnational enterprise will point toward (a) a broad statement of principles for TNCs and governments to follow; (b) a way of facilitating (sometimes through "third persons") particular agreements among governments on such issues as tax policy, antitrust policy, employment policy, environmental standards; (c) an expanded disclosure policy, and (d) some continuing (and published) review of how the agreed standards are working out.

• *To raise funds for development financing directly by fees and taxes related to the use of international "commons", and to marry the allocation of these funds to the meeting of minimum human*

needs inside each developing country, as discussed early in this chapter. The rationale for a new kind of development aid was suggested by the group which last year proposed a "planetary bargain":

> Rather than trying to pump life back into the worn-out policy of year-to-year decisions by individual governments on how much to appropriate and to whom it should go, what is needed is a flow of funds for development which are generated *automatically* under *international control.* . . . The idea of international taxation (on ships for their use of international waters, on international telecommunications, on ocean fisheries, on passports) is a hardy perennial, but we believe it should be treated as an idea whose time has come. . . .
>
> The key concepts here are automatic revenue-collecting by international agencies, related to benefits clearly derived from the taxpayers' use of the international commons; but use of the revenues to fund direct efforts to meet basic human needs in the poorer countries. . . .

• *To provide for effective international consultation on actions by national monetary authorities which substantially affect the money supply, and create international money in a manner and at a rate that is compatible with economic growth at reasonable rates of inflation.* The international monetary system is neither international nor a system. It is bound to remain on the verge of a nervous breakdown as long as (for example) the United States can export inflation the way it did in 1970-74, by issuing $40 billion to sometimes reluctant trading partners to finance U.S. payments deficits.

Rapid reform is unlikely, but a Committee of Twenty assembled by the International Monetary Fund has agreed on a course to pursue: an eventual return to stable but adjustable exchange rates; an obligation on surplus countries to get into balance that is equivalent to the present obligation on deficit countries to do so; and a phase-out of gold and reserve currencies in favor of Special Drawing Rights, an international money that would become the central reserve asset and the main means of settlement among central banks. The main thing is to manage the creation of international money in a

manner and at a rate that are compatible with economic growth at tolerable rates of inflation—the definition of what is tolerable being itself a product of international consultation.

• *To regulate conflict, promote research, develop protein, conserve fisheries, and explore, exploit and share the revenues from the oceans, the continental margin and the deep seabed.* The world is now in the decisive phase of negotiations on a Law of the Sea treaty to govern the 70% of the earth's surface covered by oceans. The United States has vital interests in protecting some freedom to operate at sea, in ensuring passage through international straits, in protecting the marine environment, and in getting a fair share from ocean fisheries and seabed oil and hard minerals.

The United States and the other countries that are advanced in marine technologies, including Japan, West Germany and the Soviet Union, can promote those interests by accepting a generous degree of revenue-sharing from seabed resource development (along the lines of the 1970 U.S. proposal) for countries which lack offshore resources or the means to exploit the seabed—and by deciding (before we are pushed into a decision) to let developing countries share reasonably in marine technology and the making of decisions about the ocean "commons." The developing nations, for their part, will have to be willing to moderate excessive jurisdictional claims on ocean space, and to accept decision-making systems which take into account not only their numerical majority but the special capabilities in ocean space of a comparatively few nations. In the case of minerals on the ocean floor, there may well be some nourishment in the idea of joint ventures between an international seabed authority which would "own" the resources (in trust for the world community) and the enterprises (private or public) which have the technologies and skilled people to scrape them off the bottom and get them working for "growth with fairness."

The *third* and most "natural" target for international action are *the functions which are international by their very nature, and require world institutions to manage them:*

• To collect and disseminate better information and guesses about the weather—and move toward international standards for weather modification.

- To develop the fairest and cheapest systems of international global communications, including the use of satellites.

- To create an international system for the use and protection of resource data derived from the constantly improving sensors operating from space vehicles.

- To promote research on common threats to mankind, such as damage to the ozone layer—and common opportunities for mankind, such as building solar power stations in outer space.

> . . . it is technologically feasible to build a colony in space, to build power stations to send energy back to the United States.
>
> Charles Price, chemist

8.

THE THIRD TRY: WORLD-ORDER DIPLOMACY

THE DIPLOMATIC BUSINESS of an earlier time was mostly conducted between two or among a very few nations at a time. Of the 55 intergovernmental organizations the United States joined during the post-war generation, only one, the North Atlantic Alliance, was considered a crucial part of America's national security system and the centerpiece of American foreign policy. The Korean War, the conduct of the Cold War, the negotiation of detente, the rapprochement with China, the adventure in Indochina, and the management of the dollar were all carried on by American initiative with some (not enough) bilateral consultation with a dozen allies and virtually no discussion with all the other parties at interest.

But in "world-order politics," peace and positive-sum outcomes depend most of all on building and nourishing multilateral systems. This is partly a function of the sheer number of actors in international relations; as the number of countries rises one by one, the relationships grow by logarithmic leaps. It is often a matter of simple efficiency to deal with a group of nations on whatever affects all members of the group; Figure 2 shows that it would take 120 bilateral talks among 16 countries to duplicate what can be accomplished in one multilateral negotiation (which may include, to be sure, a good many one-on-one sessions outside the conference room or back home in capitals).

It is true that an enormous amount of bilateral conversation takes place between pairs of countries all over the world, and that the United States has bilateral relations, in one form or another, with every nation in the world today. (Those we do not "recognize," such as Cuba, Albania, Outer Mongolia, Vietnam and North Korea, our government deals with in various ways anyhow.) But an analysis of the content of these bilateral relations reveals that most of the subjects being discussed are scheduled for decision, not between the two countries conducting the bilateral conversation, but in some multilateral public process—a U.N. agency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Fig. 2

120 Bilateral Relationships



Development, the Organization of American States, the European Economic Community, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, the European Security Conference, the international conferences and consultations on environment, population, food, women, and human settlements, the Law of the Sea conference, the International Energy Agency, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, international agreements on fishing, the weather, outer space, etc., etc. If the venue is not an intergovernmental process such as these, it may be a voluntary association, a multinational business, the international science or academic community, an international church organization, or the like.

> . . . there is no question that for a technical country such as the U.S. and for advanced scientists and engineers such as we have in this country, it is much easier to work on a bilateral basis. . . . You don't have to mess around with other inputs . . . . You come to the United Nations and you have to deal with 146 countries at various levels of technological development. Some have outlandish ideas about what can or cannot be done. It is a process of education, and it takes a much longer time, but the value is that if you finally do get an international program going, it is based on a very firm foundation, every country feels they have a part in it.
>
> William McElroy, university chancellor

In the late '60s when I had occasion to visit each U.S. mission in NATO Europe, I made a point of asking what proportion of the business on each Ambassador's desk was strictly bilateral business, and what proportion was essentially bilateral conversation about business done multilaterally. My estimate at the time was that the multilateral content of bilateral diplomacy ranged between 60 and 75%; now, nearly a decade later, the average is probably at the high end of that range.

When it comes to gathering political and economic information, the bilateral mode is still an appropriate style for diplomacy. But when it comes to negotiation, most of the business—even in a "bilateral" Embassy—is multilateral.

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AS THESE WORDS are written (in the autumn of 1976), a large amount of rather sluggish "North-South" business, designed to get beyond the rhetorical confrontation between the poor nations and the rich nations, is being conducted in a variety of multilateral forums.

A World Food Council, the product of a U.S.-initiated World Food Conference in Rome, is trying to get agreement on aid to agricultural production and a global system of reserve buffer stocks for grain. A comprehensive treaty on the Law of the Sea is in procrastinative negotiation in New York. In Paris, oil-consumers are talking to oil-producers, after the industrial countries agreed to the developing nations' condition that the same 27 countries discussing oil would in parallel address other subjects of special interest to the Third World—commodity prices, trade policies, development assistance and monetary reform.

Although the 27 are all U.N. members, the venue for their talks is not even by courtesy a United Nations body. Neither is the World Food Council, though it grew out of a 1974 Food Conference called by the U.N. General Assembly. The Law of the Sea sessions were arranged by the U.N., but are discussing the establishment of an international seabed authority which would not be a U.N. agency. Where does the U.N. fit in? Can the needed functional systems be built within the Charter and Organization called the United Nations?

Part of the answer depends on how the hothouse politics of the U.N. itself develops. It would be best if the United Nations could provide the framework for development of the new and adaptive international functions which together constitute the next try at world order. The purposes of the Charter reflect the values of Western civilization; the first five pages of the Charter, its policy paragraphs, could not be renegotiated today without losing much of their substance. But the decision to build the new order inside or outside of the U.N. no longer rests with the United States, or its industrial-democracy allies. It rests with the Third World caucus, the "Group of 77".

If the political leaders of the Third World continue to use the General Assembly and its committees as their caucus room, the real-life international operations relating to food, energy, commodities, oceans, money, and transnational enterprise will doubtless develop outside the framework of the Charter and the Organization called the United Nations. If the Third World, maintaining its impressive political solidarity, decides to have its caucus across the street or down

the hall, and then come into the United Nations and deal in a spirit of negotiation with the Atlantic and Pacific industrial nations, then the United Nations can continue to be a world organization. The system cannot work both ways at once; the sorry experience of UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the enfeeblement of UNESCO in Paris, are evidence enough of that.

The crucial decisions probably do not have to do with the future of the U.N. as an organization, but with the quality of international cooperation in the issues already suggested. If the U.N. majority keeps dealing the U.N. out of the new game, the developing nations and the industrial democracies (and the Communist nations east and west, whenever they decide to be more than off-stage noises in the new international economic order) will have to invent new international structures that can serve as true meeting places for negotiation about action.

Almost all the new functions are developing outside the U.N. Those which are being negotiated outside of U.N. forums include strategic arms control, mutual force reduction in Europe, the coordination of nuclear export policy, and the development of new institutions to deal with food, energy, raw materials, and seabed minerals.

Some of the arguments about trade are held in UNCTAD, but most of the real negotiations about reducing trade barriers take place in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Monetary reform is discussed in the Group of 20 under the International Monetary Fund, though the operational consulting is still done among central bankers and finance ministers of the ten countries which "produce" most of the world's money. A U.N. panel of "eminent persons" studied multinational corporations; the outcome was a useful U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations and a problematically useful Commission of governments. The Center has already done much sensible and factual work. The Commission is a forum for rhetoric, but the actual behavior of transnational enterprise is still mostly discussed between the multinationals and the individual host and home governments that severally regulate their arms and legs.

The United Nations has staked out a clear jurisdiction in a few important fields. The U.S. foreign-aid program used to be the biggest external contributor to the economic growth of the less developed

lands; the U.N. system, including the World Bank, is now far and away the largest contributor of grants and loans for development. The U.N. Environmental Programme, led in its first two years by a dynamic Canadian businessman and now by an imaginative Egyptian scientist, has taken the initiative in inventing a global pollution monitoring service. The U.N. did not manage to develop a collective security function as envisaged in the Charter, but has mounted a score of peacekeeping operations, "soldiers without enemies" ranging up to brigade strength; the precarious peace which has followed each of the Arab-Israeli wars could not have been arrived at without the U.N.'s blue-helmets to serve as buffer forces on Israel's prickly frontiers.

The United Nations has also sponsored a series of world conferences which in the perspective of history may well be seen as historic. These giant sensitivity training sessions, despite the rhetoric of "action programs," are not really called to "do" anything. They are designed to gather a large crowd from all over, and raise the world's attention level for an important part of the interdependent whole. We have already had such meetings on environment (1972), population (1974), food (1974), women (1975), and human settlements (1976). Two more "town meetings of the world" are pegged for 1977 on deserts and on water management. A U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development is already scheduled for 1979, and there may be a U.N. conference on children some time soon.

I think we have been, as a people, far too much inclined to pluralism in a bad sense. We've been saying, in effect, that there are thousands of organizations each of which can solve its problems independently. . . . [But] the various organisms that need to interact must, just as the parts of the United Nations must, get together more and more.

Bowen Dees, scientist

We should not underestimate the power of such talkfests. Out of Stockholm came the U.N. Environmental Programme and the beginnings of a world-wide system for monitoring some of the uglier consequences civilization brings in its train. The Bucharest meeting helped make population control respectable, and hastened the massive shift in individual attitudes that is beginning to be reflected now in

lowered estimates of future fertility rates. The Rome session spawned the World Food Council, a new push for aid to food production, and hopefully a world food reserve system. Mexico City put the status of women on the global agenda and started educating the women of affluent nations that, for the female poor, their poverty may be even more important than their sex. The wide-ranging Vancouver meeting on "Habitat" (human settlements) helped put basic human needs on the international map.

WHETHER THE U.N. becomes the inclusive framework for the new order will depend not only on what its member governments intend, but on the way they make decisions together—and on the quality of policy analysis they encourage international executives to do.

The U.N.'s voting procedure, which was derived from parliamentary practice in the West, has turned out to be a damaging handicap. It is clear now from a generation of experience that the more voting there is, the less action there is. This is sometimes true in clubs and villages and cities and national governments too: voting moves each issue to quick disagreement about words rather than careful agreement about action.

The Charter, mostly written by Americans and other Westerners, established a pseudo-parliamentary system for making decisions. But that is not how decisions are made in most of the world; they are made in various fashions *by consensus* among those who have the capacity to act, and the interest in acting, on a given issue. And it is noticeable that in international meetings where action is the intended result, there is now an increasing trend toward "no objection" or "consensus" procedures rather than a "division of the house" which makes the disagreements clear but inhibits doing anything about them. As Dean Rusk once said, people argue differently when they argue toward a conclusion and when they argue toward action.

During the debate on U.S. objections to the U.N.'s "automatic majority," at the 1974 General Assembly, the Indonesian delegate spoke thoughtfully of his country's tradition of decision making through *musyawarah* and *mufakat,* consultations and consensus. "Most of our countries," he said, "have at one stage or another known

that method. The process may be lengthy, cumbersome, sometimes exasperating, but we are much better off than immediately after our independence when we experimented with the 'half-plus-one-is-right' method. . . ." As we rebuild the United Nations and/or begin to fashion new or adapted institutions to take on new international functions, the West will do well to look for viable alternatives to "half-plus-one-is-right."

In form, the U.N. General Assembly and each of its Specialized Agencies is a large committee of instructed representatives of sovereign governments, served by a secretariat. The secretary of a committee has difficulty taking the initiative; Dag Hammarskjold did so with some vigor, but he only got away with it for a short time. Future international operating functions will require a quality of executive leadership that can deal with governments at government level, as the Secretaries General of NATO (each of whom has served as Chairman, not secretary, of the North Atlantic Council) and the Commissioners of the European Community have customarily been able to do.

Such executive leadership could also fill the U.N. delegates' felt need to have available to them an independent elucidation of the issues involved, a professional casting up of costs and benefits, an analytical look at alternative futures that enables diplomats not trained as systems analysts to judge with some accuracy the consequences of what their governments say they want.

This function—I would call it *catalytic policy analysis*—is curiously absent from the crowded scene of international bureaucracy. The Secretary General of the United Nations has no staff think-tank responsible for keeping under professional review the situation as a whole. As one of the instigators of the U.N. Institute for Training and Research a dozen years ago, I had hopes that it could develop the independence and professional competence to help the Member States project the consequences of their desires; but UNITAR has focused on more specialized and less controversial research.

The pluralistic management of interdependence will require a constant stream of "advisories" from analysts who are not obliged to write a brief for a national negotiating position, but can relate to each other the disparate boutiques in the global bazaar. Only thus will the representatives working on pieces of the puzzle be enabled to

face the most puzzling dilemma of all: that in a pluralistic system, where "planning" is improvisation on a general sense of direction, you have to think hard about strategies for dealing with the whole predicament in order to act relevantly on any part of it.

WHAT MAY WELL DEVELOP is a two-tier international system. Broad initiatives and declarations of principle require some sense of participation by all who are affected by an international operation. But most of the new international operations are likely to be put together and managed by "consortia of the concerned." Even in the World Weather Watch—there is nothing more global than weather—most of the work is done and most of the money is spent by a very few nations, especially the United States and the Soviet Union which set up the first two big centers for processing the complex computerized meteorological data from all over the world. Intelsat, the communication satellite organization which the Soviets have not joined, is a consortium of the concerned which actually owns the satellites that now carry an enormous volume of the world's long-distance messages.

Two principles will make a two-tier international system politically feasible. One is that in the operating entities—for environmental monitoring, commodity stabilization, food reserves, energy planning, investment regulation, monetary management, development financing, seabed exploration, or whatever—both the producers and consumers be fairly represented.

That does not mean everybody should be in on every act, but merely that every nation should feel that its kinds of interests are effectively brought into the bargaining. This is in fact the way the Paris talks on oil and other issues were set up: 27 nations are discussing global issues that affect 150 nations. (One of several reasons why the Law of the Sea negotiations have not managed to agree on anything yet is that the periodic conferences include all 150 of the parties at interest.)

The United States is clear about this principle—up to a point. When it comes to petroleum, we are among the leading consumer

advocates. We insist the OPEC should not be setting prices and deciding production levels and allocating supplies without participation by the world's oil consumers. But if several food-consuming countries were to turn up at the U.S. Department of Agriculture tomorrow—as they doubtless will—demanding their right to participate in the meetings where our "domestic" price incentives are managed, the first reaction at least would be to put the chain on the door and question whether the food consumers were serious. They are—just as we are on oil. Global bargaining will be done in a spirit of mutuality or not at all.

The other principle is that the smaller operating entities will have to have some obligation to report to and consult with the rest of the world, whose interests they are touching with their everyday operations.

For this purpose a global assembly—the U.N. General Assembly for some functions, specialized assemblies or big *ad hoc* conferences for others—is an indispensable ingredient in the recipe for a consensus that enables those who are most involved to get on with a management task while keeping in touch with a wider consultation circle. There are many examples of this principle at work already—the Executive Directors of the World Bank, who represent regional groupings in the Bank's governance, and the Security Council of the United Nations, which has five permanent and ten rotating members, are cases in point.

The drafters of both the League of Nations Covenant and the U.N. Charter were preoccupied with "enforcement" of "decisions." In a nobody-in-charge system, it is hard to find a real-world referent for these words.

The key actors in international relations, as far ahead as can now be seen, will be sovereign nation-states, with advice and pressure from nongovernmental organizations as various as transnational companies and peace movements. "Enforcement" means in practice the use of national governmental authority to make something happen (or, in environmental control for example, to prevent something from happening). Before governments will use their authority, they are going to want to bargain with other governments about what each government is going to do, and how the many separate but parallel "enforcements" are going to work together. And that leads us back to consensus.

There is no point in a vote by which nations that must participate to make an operation work are left in a disgruntled minority. On arms control, on peacekeeping, and on the long list of what needs to be done next about growth with fairness, if those nations which are essential to "enforcement" don't yet agree we have to keep talking. When they do agree in good faith, enforcement is not a problem. To make sure of the good faith, most international bargains will have to arrange monitoring and appoint watchdogs—and keep going back to the bargaining table for the tedious but necessary process of adjusting the machinery of peace to the changes that if blocked will lead to war.

9.

The Melding of "Foreign" and "Domestic"

WORLD ORDER is new business for the international community, not only because new subjects are involved for which effective international institutions do not yet exist, but because much of the subject-matter has traditionally been considered not international but internal affairs.

Diplomats are trained to discuss internal politics while pretending they are discussing international relations. Listening to U.N. debates about a New International Economic Order you might think they were arguments about the rules governing negotiation of international trade, international investment and international finance. But what each country mostly wants from "international negotiations" is changes in other countries' "domestic" attitudes, practices and policies.

In a world food system, most of the members will be concerned with how the producing countries will arrange the farm subsidies to bring out the most food at the least cost. The outcome of international oil talks depends on the domestic (and regional) ambitions of Arab leaders, and in the industrial countries on whether national programs for "domestic" energy conservation and development of alternative energy sources are stalled or in motion.

Commodity agreements are devices whereby consumers and producers of coffee, cocoa, copper, or cotton can influence each other's decisions about price, and be sure that what is produced at the agreed price can be bought by consumers inside the importing countries. The international discussion of transnational enterprise mostly has to do with regulation of their behavior by governments where each government's writ runs, which is at home.

Development planning, especially by the world's ambitious "middleclass" nations such as Brazil, Mexico, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Israel, features the growth of manufactures most of which will have to be marketed in the big domestic markets of the

more affluent countries. Foreign access to those markets is an issue in the domestic politics of the industrial states. The "export of jobs" through changes in industrial geography is an issue on which an American politician can lose the political support of organized labor.

Negotiations about the law of the sea spark anxieties and ambitions among differing groups of fishermen and mining interests, who are influential in the internal politics of the United States and other technologically advanced countries. In a world where one nation's litter can be global pollution, the internal control of environmental impacts is increasingly a matter for international negotiation. Decisions by monetary authorities about money supply and exchange rates, typically taken on the basis of "domestic" considerations, have pervasive international effects.

Attitudes toward internal growth in the industrial countries may essentially determine the rate and character of development in the rest of the world, which depends on the industrial nations as trading partners, investors, and sources of loans and grants. And attitudes toward the meeting of minimum human needs inside the poorer countries may determine how much help they can get from the richer countries by pleading poverty.

The third try at world order will probably have to recognize, more candidly than heretofore, that the content of international bargaining is mostly the internal decisions of the national bargainers.

THE DOMESTICATION of international relations is not a theory about the future; it is a transition already under way.

At the governmental level, every agency has its own international relations. Actions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture are among the most important decisions made about the world food balance. The Federal Aviation Agency maintains a web of transnational relationships to make global air travel safer. Federal energy agencies try to conserve fuel and encourage alternatives to imported oil—and thus determine what the United States and its industrialized allies can accomplish in negotiating with the oil producers' cartel. The Environmental Protection Agency finds that many forms of pollution require international cooperation to monitor

and control. Each new technological breakthrough—fast computers, weather modification, remote sensing of crops and geological formations from orbiting satellites, discoveries in disease prevention, new ways to fish and drill and mine and build in marine environments—brings with it a new tangle of international claims and conflicts.

In the so-called "old-line" Departments, the interdependence functions are also of growing importance—Justice's immigration controls, Treasury's Coast Guard and debt-management operations, Commerce's weather service, and Interior's Pacific Islands are just a few of a hundred examples. The quasi-independent bodies also have foreign policies of their own. The Federal Reserve Board has a dominant voice in determining the growth rate of the world's largest stock of international money, the U.S. dollar. And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the power, which it has not yet decided how to use, to veto a White House decision to export nuclear materials or equipment.

Despite these well-known facts, it is almost literally true that only one person in the Executive Branch is hired to work on *both* domestic and international policy. His title is President of the United States.

One of the most elementary doctrines about the management of large-scale systems is that a supervisory office should not be set up in the same way as its subordinate offices—that, indeed, it should be deliberately organized to cut across the vertical divisions below, in order to illuminate their interrelationships and inconsistencies before issues come to the top executive for "decision." Each of the Cabinet Departments was established essentially to deal either with national security/foreign policy matters, or with domestic policy. Yet the White House has for three decades been organized the same way, coordinating State and Defense and the intelligence community through a National Security Council (NSC), and gathering the rest of the government into a "Domestic Council," the lineal successor of a function performed by staff officers under a variety of names ever since the Truman Administration.

Since the system does not fit the function, dissonance between foreign and domestic policies is normal. Most Americans remember how the price of bread in the local supermarket went up when the U.S. Government failed to regulate Soviet grain purchases in 1972. Lift the veil from the price of oil, the market for soybeans,

the law of the sea, the sale of arms and the export of nuclear equipment, and you will find ready examples of international ramifications unpredicted, ignored or suppressed.

What to do? There is no way that these interdependence issues can be stuffed into the one Cabinet department supposedly responsible for international affairs. Managing the U.S. involvement in international bargaining, and relating the transactions to each other, will still be the job of the Secretary of State as the President's deputy for dealing with foreigners. But the *content* of these negotiations reaches so deep into American politics (the oil crisis is displayed at the filling station, Soviet wheat purchases raise the price of bread at the local supermarket, decisions about the global money supply are felt in the consumer's pocketbook) that the Secretary of State can't become fully responsible for them without being elected President. With the two unimpressive exceptions already noted, that hasn't happened since John Quincy Adams.

The dozen or so Interdependence Assemblies that have been conducted this year did conclude, without exception, that the U.S. can provide leadership. In fact, most agreed the U.S. has a prime responsibility to do so. But it must do so without the appearance of arrogance or the act of bullying.

William Bodine, organization executive

The answer is probably to view foreign policy, Adam Yarmolinsky suggests, as "not a subject matter for government decision-making; it is rather an aspect of every important government decision."

The implications are far-reaching. If logically pursued, the White House "domestic council" would become an "interdependence council," and would include the Cabinet officers responsible for foreign relations and defense management. Below the White House level, Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers in each department would be recruited to play personal roles on a world stage, explaining the United States policy and absorbing criticism directly, not filtered through the State Department.

• The Secretary of Agriculture should know that one of his primary mandates (working closely with the agricultural constituency and with Congress) is to help establish a system of world food reserves,

rearranging general incentives in such a way that they reward not scarcity but abundance.

• Officials charged with energy policy would think of their function as part of a world system designed to ensure fuel supplies to allies and developing nations as well as the United States, and also designed to minimize the proliferation of the capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

• The Secretary of the Treasury would know that his mandate includes helping to invent a more international monetary system and finding ways to finance buffer stocks of major world commodities, to assure continuity of supply and price stability for producers and consumers in relation to long-term market forces.

• The Secretary of Commerce would as a primary task work toward effective international arrangements to resolve differences among transnational enterprises, host countries and home countries over such issues as taxation, employment, and competitive practices.

The President's ranking deputy for world-order diplomacy would still be the Secretary of State, the ranking American negotiator in an increasingly complex international decision process. But the department he heads could not even dream of having a monopoly of "foreign affairs." For the whole government, international policy would be part of day-to-day decision making.

To serve as the opposite number to a White House-based interdependence council, Congress would need a joint committee on interdependence. Here there are several useful models—the joint committees on the economic report and on atomic energy, and the arrangement now being tested for a Congressional Budget Office tied in with two committees on the budget that are supposed to balance total Federal income with total outgo.

The interdependence issues cut across the traditional jurisdiction of Congressional committees, just as they cut across the responsibilities of existing executive departments. A joint standing committee with explicit responsibility for analysing such cut-across issues might give the public something of Congressional origin to compare with the President's proposals, and thus enable the Congress to avoid the present unhappy choice between sounding negative or appearing acquiescent.

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BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH to reflect in the Federal Government the blurring of the line between "domestic" and "international." The essence of America has always been that the government's sense of direction derives from where individual citizens and their non-governmental organizations are already going. Looking around, it is easy to see that our pluralistic polity is going international.

The communications media operate all over the world; indeed, a growing Third-World complaint is that the news of the world is purveyed by a small number of predominantly American news services. (On the other side of the coin, one of the main common carriers we now use is an international satellite communications company.) Half of the world's multinational business is done by U.S.-based firms. The trade union movement has not yet found effective ways to internationalize itself, but some labor leaders are looking for ways to bargain with international managers in an international way. Non-profit organizations, foundations, service organizations such as the YMCA and the Girl Scouts, research institutes, student-exchange programs and church-based missionary movements have all in some degree had to internationalize their foreign operations, welcome a more equal relationship with cooperating groups abroad, hire non-Americans to handle their overseas operations, and even bring non-Americans onto their governing boards. Our educational systems are led by the logic of world developments to look for ways to rethink their curricula in global perspective.

One of our prime advantages in international relations is that we are a credibly nobody-in-charge society ourselves. The fact that our Government is constrained by domestic pressures is no national security secret, it is right out there in the open. That circumstance is sometimes not comfortable for an official American representative.

But when other governments can understand by reading our newspapers why the U.S. government acts the way it does, they are more likely to adjust their own behavior because they know the United States cannot tell its own citizens what to think and say. They may resent, but they cannot ignore, our essential pluralism.

Even abroad, the United States operates through a thousand channels at once. Despite all the talk (which has been partly a reflection of reality, of course) about CIA agents masquerading as

businessmen, journalists and diplomats, everyone knows that nearly all Americans travelling abroad are *not* part of a government apparatus or subject to government instructions on what they say or do. And people from other countries, travelling or studying in America, feel the comparative freedom from official supervision which is one of the continuing attractions of our durable democracy.

But if American nongovernmental organizations live in a thickening web of international relationships, and if they don't have to take what their government says as gospel and mandate, then they have to think for themselves. So it is that business firms, labor unions, farm cooperatives, professional associations, philanthropic foundations, schools and colleges, consumer and public-interest groups, churches and clubs, movie studios, networks and news media all have—or are groping for—a foreign policy of their own. Each must think hard about the situation as a whole: the nature of interdependence, the limits to choice, the risks to security, the strategy of growth, the criteria for fairness, the management of multilateral structures, the interaction between "domestic" programs and their "international" connections—whether those connections take a competitive or cooperative form. In a word, they must cope with interdependence.

Those nongovernmental organizations which have frequent turnover in their leadership are likely to adjust most readily to their newly interdependent surroundings, though the change sometimes requires a leadership battle or a bad mistake, or both. Those structures which change their leadership less frequently (many large business firms, labor unions, hierarchical churches and philanthropic foundations) tend to adjust less rapidly to changes in the environment for accomplishing their missions. In both cases, however, the critical factor in adjustment is hard mental labor about what it will take for their organizations to live with interdependence—and how their own changes in strategy will mesh with the similar mutations of other organizations in their own fields, in the U.S. and abroad.

In 1975 a National Commission on Coping with Interdependence, (not appointed by the Government but convened by businessman Robert O. Anderson) ruminated about all this and decided that the key to making sense, for naturally pluralistic Americans in a necessarily pluralistic world, is "to rethink this fading distinction between 'domestic' and 'international'." It is "a staggering assign-

ment," the commissioners conceded. "But it is," we believe, "central to our future for Americans to act, each in his or her own context, as though we really were citizens of the world as well as residents of our favorite part of it.

"This basic change of attitude will not come in the first instance from executive edicts or legislative enactments. It will come from a review of the implications of interdependence by each of the major institutions which help govern our pluralistic policy—by corporations and their associations, by organized labor, by farm organizations, by foundations and non-profit enterprise, by school systems, colleges and universities, and educational associations, by newspapers, magazines, the electronic media and journalism associations, and by governments, municipal and state as well as federal. . . .

There is a beautiful book, a suggestive book that might be worth our reading again: *Richer by Asia* by Edmund Taylor. It's about the psychology of leadership but I remember one line of it: "Today . . . we are all of us, consciously or unconsciously, waking or sleeping, building the unity of man or plotting the end of the world."

Harris Wofford, college president

"No group of citizens can prescribe in detail the actions each American organization should take to cope effectively with interdependence. Our society is too thoroughly pluralistic for that. What we have done, instead, is to suggest an attitude—already present in some degree in some institutions, but yet to emerge in others. Our central theme is as old as the Declaration of Independence—that everything Americans do should be measured by its effect on the rights and duties of 'all Men,' because Americans need to be self-conscious citizens of the world.

"Each American institution might usefully create its own tailor-made checklist for the interdependence era, from such general urgings as these:

- We can express our organizations' purposes in world terms, as our Founding Fathers did 200 years ago.

- We can bring non-Americans into our future planning.

- We can place the leadership of any overseas operations in the hands of local non-Americans, just as soon as they can take it on.

- We can make sure our house organs and other publications are carrying news and opinion about international developments that affect our organizations' purposes.

- We can focus on American interdependence in some of our year-round local activities and in part of our annual conference or management meeting.

- We can ask ourselves, from day to day and month to month, are we doing as much as we can to reflect the fact of growing interdependence in our own plans?

- We can encourage those activities, educational and cultural, which seek to broaden American understanding of other peoples, their heritages, histories and aspirations."

10.

ATTITUDES IN TRANSITION

THE NOTION that in order to "interdepend" we Americans will need a whole new set of basic attitudes would be presumptuous and absurd—if that attitudinal shift were not already well under way.

In the recent history of the United States, people-in-general have tended to abandon worn-out ideas, and grope for new ones, before their government and other large organizations do. In recent years, for example, U.S. Government leaders were among the last to learn that the war in Vietnam was over. Our demographic curve had dropped below replacement fertility rates, and the growth curve of school and college enrollments was already sagging, before government and education planners adjusted to no-growth or low-growth assumptions. Consumerism and the environmental movement were well under way before Congress set up an Environmental Protection Agency, and the courts began to decide that citizens' rights were affected by deterioration in their living and working conditions, and the automobile industry noticed that cars were unsafe.

As American opinion moves in . . . new directions, it is apparent that our "leadership institutions" have mostly been following, not leading, the people at large. We Americans can certainly adjust our attitudes on interdependence even faster—if today's and tomorrow's leaders help to point the way.

National Commission on Coping with Interdependence

A similar lag is apparent in changing attitudes about the status of women, the rights of children, the legitimation of pornography, the wider acceptance of abortion, the nearly universal approval of family planning by one method or another. Whatever one thinks of each of these shifts in emphasis and values, they have in common that they started at the grassroots and not in our leadership insti-

tutions. If, as *Webster's* says, an attitude is a "state of readiness to act . . . that may be activated by an appropriate stimulus into significant or meaningful behavior," we might look for clues to future American behavior in attitudes that are already in transition.

Indeed, the most hopeful sign that the United States will succeed in coping with interdependence, as it has coped with the other big challenges in its lively history, is that we are even now on our way. In the pragmatic American way, we are beginning to understand interdependence not by theorizing about it, but by getting on with it. ("If you want to know the taste of a pear," said Mao Tse-tung, "you must change it by eating it yourself.")

The emergence of a new American worldview can be seen in five parallel and simultaneous shifts in very basic assumptions and attitudes.

The discovery of ecology. No one can say just when it happened. But a generation ago pundits, politicians and professors were still talking and teaching about science and technology as Man's instruments for controlling natural systems. Sometime between then and now, most of us learned that what "works" is Man working *with* Nature; the word "symbiosis" has even crept into the vernacular.

The implications of this change in perspective are enormous. Suddenly more is not necessarily better, wastage of cheap energy is not ordained, resources are not "gifts from God" without strings, air and water are not free goods. Millions of people and thousands of leaders who have never thought systematically about the sevenfold limits (see Chapter 5) are *acting* as though they had.

One evidence of the shift is the erosion in the formerly very fixed notion that knowledge has to be applied just because it is known—which used to lead almost automatically to the conviction that if a new weapon or an advanced system can be imagined, it must be manufactured. But we all seem to know instinctively now that new technologies have their dark side. Boeing did not build a supersonic transport plane; there was public applause when the U.S. agreed with the Soviet Union not to expand anti-ballistic missile systems; and reluctance about nuclear energy has become a ladder to political power, as both the nuclear power industry and the Swedish socialists now know to their sorrow. The earth can be a safe,

dynamic and resilient planet, people are coming to believe—if we make it so, and don't blow our chance to work with rather than against Nature.

The nature of power. People have begun to notice that modern weapons have transformed the nature of military power, especially when applied to the many-centered politics of a leaderless world. The big nuclear weapons seem to be unusable except for deterrence. In quarrels with smaller powers, as Stanley Hoffmann says, mere power can make us simply the biggest fly on the flypaper. (The Chinese have their own image: "Big Noise on Stairs Nobody Coming Down.") Even for deterrence, beyond a survivable capacity to devastate an adversary, more is not safer and may be irrelevant.

. . . power is both awful and fragile, and can dominate a continent, only in the end to be blown down by a whisper.

R. H. Tawney, historian

At the other end of the range, "conventional" weapons are becoming so accurate that a few in the determined hands of a "weak" country may be able, short of all-out war, to stand off not only regional powers but the superpowers themselves. You no longer have to be the biggest kid on the block; you just have to learn the latest judo or karate self-defense techniques.

The power of disruption also puts more cards in the hands of the "weak." The Arab oil embargo was itself an instance of the political manipulation of one of the key "valves" in the world economy.

If a sizable number of Third World countries came to feel that the industrial countries could not be persuaded toward fairness but had to be pushed, their "collective self-reliance" could take some interesting forms. If many of them should boycott international arrangements that require general consent—nuclear safeguards, weather watch, crop forecasting, epidemic control, narcotics smuggling, environmental monitoring, and measures against hijacking and terrorism—everybody would lose, but the greater powers would suffer the greater losses.

Moreover, the fragile complexity of urban civilization makes many kinds of international operations extremely vulnerable to de-

liberate disruption: air traffic, pipelines, telephone control points and power centrals are only the most obvious examples.

The coming international bargains will appear in the guise of political and economic deals. But they will reflect the sobering shift in the power (which includes the willingness) to take relevant military action.

The double imperative of fairness. The coming international bargains will also reflect the growing "power of poverty," the widespread attitude inside the rich countries that, much as the radical rhetoric is resented, the fairness revolution has equity—and time—on its side.

But here the real power to get things moving rests with the political leadership of the developing nations. For the pro-fairness people in the rich countries have to reckon with two kinds of disillusionment, which they feel and their opponents use against them. One is technology's loss of face in the repeated demonstration, of which the Sahel (Chapter 4) is only one of many examples, that outside contributions to development may not help, and may even do harm, unless they are part of a national effort by educated people, effectively led, who are working hard to bring about internal change such as land reform.

The other disenchantment has to do with the distribution of wealth and income inside the "poor nations." Beating us over the head with a rhetorical two-by-four has now secured our attention to the issue of fairness among nations. But our attention has also been caught by the other fairness issue—the wide, in some parts of the Third World widening, gap between rich and poor inside Third World nations.

An overwhelming majority of Americans now think that, sovereignty or no sovereignty, the domestic policies about who gets what are part of international politics. In one 1975 survey, 91 percent of a sample of Americans (96 percent of those over 50) agreed with the statement that "Too much of our foreign assistance is kept by the leaders of poor countries and does not get to the people." Unless ways are found to relate international economic cooperation to direct benefits to the neediest, the "power of poverty" in the politics of the rich countries will be eroded by a waning enthusiasm for making any bargain at all.

Doubts about the "Western model." The policy-making peoples of the industrial democracies are persuaded by a generation of trial and error that their experts on development do not know enough to be confident of their own wisdom. The earlier assumption was that "development" went through ineluctable "stages of growth;" we thought we knew where they were headed because we had just passed that way ourselves. But we are no longer so sure that where other peoples are going is where we have been or that what they should want—in patterns of industry, consumption, urban life, individual liberty and political institutions—is what we have achieved. We are not even sure about some of them for ourselves.

To pretend to know when you do not is a disease.

Lao Tse (6th Century B.C.)

Meanwhile the early copyists, the Masaryks and Sukarnos and others who issued declarations of independence and wrote constitutions strikingly similar to our own, have been pushed out by Marxist or military successors who put economic growth ahead of human rights. And Americans, watching from afar the corruptibility of parliamentary institutions, saw no alternative to dealing with authoritarian regimes in most developing countries, but still hope the Third World will soon find its Jeffersons and Madisons to reconcile—in theory if not always in practice—human rights with economic development.

A new style of leadership. In industrial society a new leadership style is now recognized as essential to the management of "horizontal" systems, where few of the key actors are clearly "bosses" or "subordinates," and a collegial, consultative mode of behavior is mandatory.

The community of nations, where nobody is in charge but each nation's leaders are wedded to national sovereignty, presents an extreme case of "horizontal administration." The hallmarks of effective action by national governments are (as with individuals who administer complexity) the soft voice and the low key, the search for consensus (rather than choosing up sides and voting), the constructive use of ambiguity, and a spirit of optimism unwarranted by the known facts. "The nature of modern leadership is that it doesn't show—and especially that it doesn't show off."

One key to the planetary bargaining process, a major element in our international relations during the years just ahead, will thus be the skill and sensitivity of Americans to deal with nations large and small on a basis of equality, dignity, and mutual respect. It will not be easy, it will often be exasperating, it will take the kind of patience that Americans are not world-famous for. The central dilemma in the participatory system is as familiar as it is inescapable: how do you get everybody in on the act and still get some action? Consultation and consensus will nevertheless be the mandatory style of governance in the global village.

JOHN F. KENNEDY'S rhetoric was overblown—and the world-view it reflected was already blowing away—when he announced in the 1961 inaugural "that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." But President Kennedy learned fast, and when in 1963 he again described the purpose of United States actions in the world, he was well ahead of his time: ". . . to make the world safe for diversity."

But diversity, like interdependence, is not an aim all by itself. It is, rather, a condition that can yield beneficent or malevolent results. Which way it goes depends on whether the handling of the enormous international labors just ahead are, or are not, anchored in a common acceptance of the emerging ethic of ecology which I have over-simplified as "the sevenfold limits."

Twice before, after we had helped defeat war machines that had asserted the right to take charge of world governance, the United States led in fashioning structures designed to prevent war and promote justice in what we prematurely labeled a "world community." The structures didn't work at all the first time, and didn't work very well the second time, for the old Biblical reason—they were built on sand. The world was not yet a community, and the rhetoric of political leaders could not make it so. The world was, rather, a collection of what Madison would have called "factions" which did not yet accept the limitations on their action and the harnessing of their discretion that a sense of community would require.

What will be different about the third try at world order?

One difference is a really new set of conditions, the unprecedented consequence of technologies without precedent, technologies that can irreversibly despoil Nature, degrade people, and make our only habitat uninhabitable.

The second difference results from the first: a growing sense of awareness about the restraints these unprecedented conditions impose on us all—not because somebody asserts the right to tell us to be prudent but because by the millions we feel it in our bones.

And the third difference is the fairness revolution. Despite their sometimes universal rhetoric, no previous revolution has in practice been more than parochial or at most regional. But the risen expectations of the world's disadvantaged majorities (partly the product of one of those unprecedented technologies, that of communications) have made the requirements side of the human equation global. It remains for the supply side to catch up.

To understand the imperatives of prudence and fairness does not require men and women of a hundred skin colors and a thousand languages to witness a prophetic vision or awaken to a new dimension in idealism. It does require people to think hard about the consequences of their actions—a skill we all start learning in the cradle—and unleash their natural-born common sense. That really is not hard for people, even for "uneducated" people who are often more commonsensical than graduate degree-holders.

It *is* hard for institutions, and especially for governments.

There is a chance, then, for a growing sense of "world community" to underpin the third try. It's far from an odds-on bet; even if the attitudes evoked by ecology are already discernible, you cannot confidently extrapolate any curve that contains the human element.

But because the other option is a world-scale Lebanon, we have to wager that this sense of community—the consequence of the new conditions, the new awareness, the new power of fairness—will become strong enough to enable governments to get on with steps toward arms control, peacekeeping machinery, and good-faith bargaining about economic and technological cooperation to meet human needs.

The third try at world order will require much of Americans, because they happen (or have chosen) to be citizens of the only nation that is truly global in its reach. But maybe we need this new adventure in "world order politics" as an instrument of American self-renewal—that is, to get our tall ship back on a course that has history with it, not against it.

NOTES

I have resisted the use of footnotes that draw the reader away from the narrative. Notes that follow indicate where a more complete treatment of some ideas can be found and who are the authors of particularly trenchant comments.

FLYLEAF AND FOREWORD

The quotations on the flyleaf are from Thomas Paine's *Common Sense,* E. B. White's *Points of My Compass,* and from a statement made by Girl Scout Margaret Kelley during the "International Congress—76" sponsored by the Girl Scouts of Greater Philadelphia, June 29-July 10, 1976. The E. B. White quotation in the text is from his charming vignette on complexity in *Quo Vadimus? Or the Case for the Bicycle* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1938), p. 26; in the same story (it originally appeared in *The New Yorker* in 1927) the same character also makes an accurate prediction: "I predict a bright future for complexity in this country."

CHAPTER 2. NOBODY IN CHARGE

Figures on defense spending in this Chapter and Chapter 6 are found in *The Military Balance,* an annual publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; and in Ruth L. Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures—1976* (Leesburg, Va.: WMSE publications, 1976). The figures on the spread of nuclear energy for power (here and in Chapter 6) are from "World List of Nuclear Power Plants," *Nuclear News,* June 30, 1976, pp. 66-79.

The international task force which met in Aspen during July 1975 arrived at a consensus that was set down in a policy paper for the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, *The Planetary Bargain: Proposals for a New International Economic Order to Meet Human*

Needs. Members of the task force came from France, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Sri Lanka, and the United States of America. The policy paper was distributed at the nongovernmental Forum held in parallel with the 7th Special Session of the United Nations during September 1975 in New York. It is available from the Aspen Institute's Program in International Affairs, P.O. Box 2820, Princeton, New Jersey, 08540. These Aspen proposals are referred to several times in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3. Interdependence: A Question of Degree

The quotation from Raymond Aron is from his background paper "Thirty Years After—Two Centuries Later" prepared for a Berlin conference on "The Future of European-U.S. Relations" in November, 1975. The paper is published in *Report from Aspen Institute Berlin* (Berlin: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976) pp. 31-46.

Chapter 4. Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit

The remark about interdependence, independence and dependence was made by Mircea Malitza, Minister for Education of Romania, while participating in the Assembly held by the Club of Rome on "New Horizons for Mankind" in Philadelphia, April 12-14, 1976.

Chapter 5. Interdependence: The Labyrinth of Mankind

Lewis Thomas' essay appears in his book, *Lives of a Cell* (New York: Bantam Books, 1975) p. 48. *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome* by Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel (New York: Dutton, 1974) was the successor to *The Limits to Growth* by D. Meadows *et al.* (New York: Universe Books, 1972), and has been followed this year by a third major report, *Reviewing the International Order* by Jan Tinbergen; the Tinbergen report will be presented at a Club of Rome meeting in Algiers this autumn and published later in Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

Chapter 6. The Third Try: Beyond Collective Security

There are many ways to define a "war." A count of 57 wars since 1945 is based on information from J. David Singer and Melvin

Small, and uses their concept of an "interstate" war. *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972). Teng Hsiao-ping's comment on strategic arms control is recorded in my *China Diary* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1976), the log of a visit to the People's Republic of China in October 1975.

The discussion in this chapter of the "calculus of equivalency" benefitted from a review by Paul H. Nitze, former Secretary of the Navy, and Professor Marshall Shulman of Columbia University.

The comments of Professor Thomas Schelling of Harvard University were made at an Aspen Arms Control Workshop on the future of U.S. national security held from August 9 to 13, 1976 in Aspen, Colorado, under the sponsorship of the Aspen Arms Control Consortium—Cornell, Harvard, and Stanford Universities, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies.

The sobering quotation from the International Peace Academy proceedings appears in an unpublished summary report "Interdependence and Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts." The conference was held in Philadelphia on April 29, 1976.

The phrases "community of the concerned" and "consortium of the concerned" are variations on a theme first expressed by Lincoln Bloomfield as the "coalition of the law-abiding" in a *New York Times* op-ed piece, "Resurrecting the U.N.," July 21, 1971. The idea was further developed in a section entitled "Coalitions for Peaceful Settlement" in *The United Nations in the 1970s,* the September 1971 report of a National Policy Panel convened by the United Nations Association and chaired by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.

The description of the U.S. as the "fat boy in the canoe" is one of many graphic images used by Dean Rusk, while he was Secretary of State, in explaining American foreign policy to American audiences.

CHAPTER 7. THE THIRD TRY: GROWTH WITH FAIRNESS

Charles Yost's comment on the limitations of GNP as an economic indicator appeared in "The Ambiguities of GNP," *Christian Science Monitor,* July 16, 1976.

The effect of the distribution of income within nations is analyzed in a number of recent publications, including Irma Adelman and

Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973); Irma Adelman, "Growth, Income Distribution and Equity-Oriented Development Strategies," *World Development,* February-March 1975, pp. 67-76; Hollis Chenery *et al., Redistribution with Growth* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). John and Magda Cordell McHale's *Human Requirements, Supply Levels and Outer Bounds* (Princeton, N.J.: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Program in International Affairs, 1975) is a first effort to develop an analytical framework for the concept of meeting basic human needs worldwide.

Judith Bruce of Family Planning International Assistance provided the figures on literacy and women, in an unpublished paper prepared for the Aspen Institute.

Robert S. McNamara's statement is from his address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group in Manila, Philippines on October 4, 1976. It may be useful to have for reference these basic World Bank estimates and projections:

INCOME DISPARITIES BETWEEN NATIONS
(in constant 1975 U.S. $)

Per Capita Income	*Population (in millions)*	*1965*	*1975*	*1985 (projected)*
1. Poorest Nations (below $200)	1,200	130	150	180
2. Midde-Income Developing Countries (above $200)	900	630	950	1,350
3. Developed Nations	700	4,200	5,500	8,100

An interesting study with a Third World perspective is "What Now," the 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report, a double volume of the journal *Development Dialogue,* published by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation with support from the Swedish International Development Authority.

The study on mineral sources is "Natural Resource Patterns, Economic Power and Mineral Supplies" by John P. Hunt of the Scripps Institution for Oceanography, University of California at San Diego. The paper was written as background for the workshop on "Future Non-Fuel Mineral Supplies" held in La Jolla, California, April 6-7, 1975 as part of the Aspen Institute project on The Planetary Bargain.

The FAO figure was reported in the 1974 *Assessment of the World Food Situation, Present and Future* prepared for the 1974 World Food conference held in Rome.

The report of the IMF's Committee of Twenty is summarized in Lal Jayawardena, "Background Material in the Fields of Trade, International Monetary Reform and Development Financing," in *A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation* (New York: United Nations, 1975).

CHAPTER 8. THE THIRD TRY: WORLD-ORDER DIPLOMACY

CHAPTER 9. THE MELDING OF "FOREIGN" AND "DOMESTIC"

The discussion of multilateral diplomacy in Chapter 8, and the analysis of the blurred line between "domestic" and "international" in the U.S. Government, in Chapter 9, are based on a report entitled "The Management of Multilateralism," which I wrote for the Murphy Commission in 1975. It is published, together with parallel reports by Richard N. Gardner and Charles W. Yost, in *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy: Appendices,* Volume 1, pp. 259-295 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1975).

The concept of "world-order politics" has been developed by Professor Richard N. Gardner of Columbia University in "The Hard Road to World Order," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1974, pp. 556-576 and in the report of a U.N. committee of experts, *A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation* (New York: United Nations, 1975), of which he was rapporteur.

The "eminent persons" report is *The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations* (New York: United Nations, 1974).

The Indonesian comment on majority rule in parliamentary systems is from a speech to the U.N. General Assembly by Chaidar Anwar Sani, Indonesia's delegate to the United Nations, quoted in an article of mine, "The U.S. vs. The U.N.?," *The New York Times Magazine,* May 4, 1975.

The need for a policy-analysis function at the international level is discussed in depth in a report by Elmore Jackson, *The Manage-*

ment of Interdependence: The Planning Function (New York: RF Working Papers, Rockefeller Foundation, 1975).

The Adam Yarmolinsky quote is from his *Organizing for Interdependence: The Role of Government,* Interdependence Series No. 5 (Princeton, N. J.: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Program in International Affairs, 1976), p. 6.

The paragraphs from the Anderson Commission can be found in *Coping with Interdependence: A Commission Report,* published for the National Commission on Coping with Interdependence (Princeton, N. J.: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Program in International Affairs, 1976).

CHAPTER 10. ATTITUDES IN TRANSITION

American concerns about international and domestic issues have been traced from year to year in the biennial *State of the Nation* analyses, by William Watts and Lloyd Free, and in the same organization's series *Policy Perspectives* (Washington: Potomac Associates, 1976).

The quote from Stanley Hoffmann is in "Toward a Pluralistic World System," *Current,* Vol. 175, September, 1975, pp. 48-52. The comment on leadership and a full discussion of the new style of leadership are contained in my book *The Future Executive* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

The context of the Kennedy phrase about making the world safe for diversity was his effort to end the Cold War and begin what came to be called *détente* by negotiating the first test-ban treaty with the Soviet Union. "It is an ironic but accurate fact," President Kennedy said at American University on June, 1963, "that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. . . . So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal." *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 232.

The warning not to extrapolate any curve that contains the human element originates with historian Barbara Tuchman.

Appendix A

A Declaration of INTERdependence

WHEN IN THE COURSE OF HISTORY the threat of extinction confronts mankind, it is necessary for the people of The United States to declare their interdependence with the people of all nations and to embrace those principles and build those institutions which will enable mankind to survive and civilization to flourish.

Two centuries ago our forefathers brought forth a new nation; now we must join with others to bring forth a new world order. On this historic occasion it is proper that the American people should reaffirm those principles on which the United States of America was founded, acknowledge the new crises which confront them, accept the new obligations which history imposes upon them, and set forth the causes which impel them to affirm before all peoples their commitment to a Declaration of Interdependence.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that the inequalities and injustices which afflict so much of the human race are the product of history and society, not of God or nature; that people everywhere are entitled to the blessings of life and liberty, peace and security and the realization of their full potential; that they have an inescapable moral obligation to preserve those rights for posterity; and that to achieve these ends all the peoples and nations of the globe should acknowledge their interdependence and join together to dedicate their minds and their hearts to the solution of those problems which threaten their survival.

To establish a new world order of compassion, peace, justice and security, it is essential that mankind free itself from the limitations of national prejudice, and acknowledge that the forces that unite it are incomparably deeper than those that divide it—that all people are part of one global community, dependent on one body of resources, bound together by the ties of a common humanity and associated in a common adventure on the planet Earth.

Let us then join together to vindicate and realize this great truth that mankind is one, and as one will nobly save or irreparably lose the heritage of thousands of years of civilization. And let us set forth the principles which should animate and inspire us if our civilization is to survive.

WE AFFIRM that the resources of the globe are finite, not infinite, that they are the heritage of no one nation or generation, but of all peoples, nations and of posterity, and that our deepest obligation is to transmit to that posterity a planet richer in material bounty, in beauty and in delight than we found it. Narrow notions of national sovereignty must not be permitted to curtail that obligation.

WE AFFIRM that the exploitation of the poor by the rich and the weak by the strong violates our common humanity and denies to large segments of society the blessings of life, liberty and happiness. We recognize a moral obligation to strive for a more prudent and more equitable sharing of the resources of the earth in order to ameliorate poverty, hunger and disease.

WE AFFIRM that the resources of nature are sufficient to nourish and sustain all the present inhabitants of the globe and that there is an obligation on every society to distribute those resources equitably, along with a corollary obligation upon every society to assure that its population does not place upon Nature a burden heavier than it can bear.

WE AFFIRM our responsibility to help create conditions which will make for peace and security and to build more effective machinery for keeping peace among the nations. Because the insensate accumulation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons threatens the survival of Mankind we call for the immediate reduction and eventual elimination of these weapons under international supervision. We deplore the reliance on force to settle disputes between nation states and between rival groups within such states.

WE AFFIRM that the oceans are the common property of mankind whose dependence on their incomparable resources of nourishment and strength will, in the next century, become crucial for human survival, and that their exploitation should be so regulated as to serve the interests of the entire globe, and of future generations.

WE AFFIRM that pollution flows with the waters and flies with the winds, that it recognizes no boundary lines and penetrates all defenses, that it works irreparable damage alike to Nature and to Man-

kind—threatening with extinction the life of the seas, the flora and fauna of the earth, the health of the people in cities and the countryside alike—and that it can be adequately controlled only through international cooperation.

WE AFFIRM that the exploration and utilization of outer space is a matter equally important to all the nations of the globe and that no nation can be permitted to exploit or develop the potentialities of the planetary system exclusively for its own benefit.

WE AFFIRM that the economy of all nations is a seamless web, and that no one nation can any longer effectively maintain its processes of production and monetary systems without recognizing the necessity for collaborative regulation by international authorities.

WE AFFIRM that in a civilized society, the institutions of science and the arts are never at war and call upon all nations to exempt these institutions from the claims of chauvinistic nationalism and to foster that great community of learning and creativity whose benign function it is to advance civilization and the health and happiness of mankind.

WE AFFIRM that a world without law is a world without order, and we call upon all nations to strengthen and to sustain the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and other institutions of world order, and to broaden the jurisdiction of the World Court, that these may preside over a reign of law that will not only end wars but end as well that mindless violence which terrorizes our society even in times of peace.

WE can no longer afford to make little plans, allow ourselves to be the captives of events and forces over which we have no control, consult our fears rather than our hopes. We call upon the American people, on the threshold of the third century of their national existence, to display once again that boldness, enterprise, magnanimity and vision which enabled the founders of our Republic to bring forth a new nation and inaugurate a new era in human history. The fate of humanity hangs in the balance. Throughout the globe, hearts and hopes wait upon us. We summon all Mankind to unite to meet the great challenge.

—Henry Steele Commager

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APPENDIX B

INTERDEPENDENCE ASSEMBLIES AND RELATED MEETINGS

CONDUCTED IN COOPERATION WITH THE BICENTENNIAL ERA (1976-1989) PROGRAM OF THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF PHILADELPHIA

"A DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE" *

The Philadelphia Conference on the Economic Interdependence of Nations, sponsored by the SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, the AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, the INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTEE of the FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION, and the AMERICAN BRANCH of the INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, March 26-27, 1976 (Richard P. Brown, Jr., Esq., Chairman, Section of International Law, ABA).

Critical Issues at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, sponsored by the WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, April 1, 1976 (Prosser Gifford, Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars).

Food, Population, Energy, and World Interdependence, sponsored by the AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY, April 6-7, 1976 (Charles C. Price, Committee on Chemistry and Public Affairs and past President, ACS).

Bicentennial Conference on The Revolution, the Constitution and America's Third Century: Committee on "The United States and the World," sponsored by the AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, April 5-10, 1976 (Adrian S. Fisher, Francis Cabell Brown Professor of International Law, Georgetown University).

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* Individual relating principally to "A Declaration of INTERdependence" on behalf of organization is indicated in parentheses.

Medical Nutrition—1976, co-sponsored by the AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, the COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF PHILADELPHIA, and the NUTRITION FOUNDATION, INC., April 9, 1976 (Edward C. Rosenow, Jr., M.D., Executive Vice President, American College of Physicians).

New Horizons for Mankind, meeting of the CLUB OF ROME, April 12-14, 1976 (Aurelio Peccei, co-founder).

Bicentennial Conference on Religious Liberty: Seminar on "Religious Liberty and International Affairs" (and related addresses), April 26-30, 1976 (Richard M. Fagley, Executive Secretary, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs).

Interdependence and Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts, sponsored by the UNITED STATES COMMITTEE of the INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, April 29, 1976 (Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye, Ret., President, IPA).

Seminars on *World Food Supply, Health and Nutrition,* and *Food, Interdependence, and U.S. Policy,* sponsored by the CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, Georgetown University, May 12, 1976 (M. Jon Vondracek, Director of Communications, CSIS).

Changing International Relationships Between the Industrial Nations, the OPEC Countries, and the Third World, sponsored by THE UNITED STATES COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INC., May 18-19, 1976 (Harvey Williams, President, United States Council).

At the Outset of America's Third Century: Coping With a Changed World, Annual Meeting of the COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, affiliated with the COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC., June 11-12, 1976 (Rolland Bushner, Director, Committees on Foreign Relations Program, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.).

Space Exploration and Space Exploitation in an Interdependent World, sponsored by the UNIVERSITY CITY SCIENCE CENTER, Philadelphia, on behalf of members of COSPAR (Committees on Space Research), June 17, 1976 (Randall M. Whaley, President, University City Science Center).

Science, Technology, and Interdependence: The ERTS Satellite and Beyond, sponsored by the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, June 25, 1976 (William A. Blanpied, Director of Communications, AAAS).

Intercontinental Congress—'76: Sessions on "People, Pollution, and Planet Earth," sponsored by GIRL SCOUTS OF GREATER PHILADELPHIA, July 2 and 7, 1976 (Mrs. Gray A. Bossert, "Planet Earth" Project Administrator, Girl Scouts of Greater Philadelphia).

Programming for Interdependence, Semi-annual Meeting of NATIONAL COUNCIL OF COMMUNITY WORLD AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS, September 26-29, 1976 (Buntzie Ellis Churchill, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Philadelphia).

The following organizations made special contributions to the Consultation other than through holding Assemblies:

- AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION (Roger B. Hawkins, Director of International Banking).

- AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN (Nancy D. Joyner, Representative for International Relations area).

Appendix C

Declaration of INTERdependence Project
Aspen Institute Consultants

Richard N. Gardner, Henry L. Moses Professor of International Law and Organization, Columbia University

Elmore Jackson, The Rockefeller Foundation

Ralph L. Ketcham, Professor of American Studies, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

Robert G. Neumann, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; Formerly U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Morocco

John G. Palfrey, Professor, School of Law, Columbia University

Seymour J. Rubin, Executive Vice President and Executive Director, American Society of International Law

Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., Principal Officer, Office of the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York

Adam Yarmolinsky, Ralph Waldo Emerson University Professor, University of Massachusetts

Charles W. Yost, Chairman of the Board, National Commission on U.S.-China Relations; Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution; Special Adviser to the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; Formerly U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

APPENDIX D

"A DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE"

Participants in Consultation
Held at Sugar Loaf Conference Center, Philadelphia
July 20-23, 1976

*Harlan Cleveland, Director, Program in International Affairs, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies (Chairman)

*Bowen C. Dees, President, Franklin Institute (Vice Chairman)

Carol E. Baumann, Director, Institute of World Affairs, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee; Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

*William W. Bodine, Jr., President, World Affairs Council of Philadelphia; Chairman of the Board, Thomas Jefferson University; Vice Chairman, "A Declaration of INTERdependence"

Ruth Bossert, "Planet Earth" Project Administrator, Girl Scouts of Greater Philadelphia

Richard P. Brown, Jr., Esq., Partner, Morgan, Lewis and Bockius; Chairman, Section of International Law, American Bar Association

Debby DiMarzio, Senior Girl Scout from Philadelphia, Pa.

William C. Doherty, Jr., Executive Director, American Institute for Free Labor Development

Lynn M. Elling, Consulting Vice President, Lincoln/Minnesota, Inc.

*Frederick Heldring, President, Philadelphia National Bank; General Chairman, "A Declaration of INTERdependence"

*Althea K. Hottel, formerly President of the American Association of University Women and the International Federation of University Women

* Designates member of Consultation Planning Group, which also included Richard N. Gardner, Seymour J. Rubin, Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., and Adam Yarmolinsky.

Paul C. Irwin, Esq., Chaplin, Barzun and Casner, Boston

Nancy D. Joyner, Research Fellow, University of Virginia, Center for Higher Education; member of Board of Directors and Representative for the International Relations Area, American Association of University Women

Patricia B. Kepler, Director of Ministerial Studies, Harvard Divinity School; President, Women's Coalition for the Third Century

*Ralph L. Ketcham, Professor of American Studies, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

Edwin M. Martin, Chairman, Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment in Developing Countries, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Mary Jo McLemore, Senior Girl Scout from West Memphis, Arkansas

Edward P. Morgan, Washington journalist and commentator

John E. Mroz, Director of Development, International Peace Academy

Robert G. Neumann, currently Project Director for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; formerly U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Morocco

Norman D. Palmer, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Charles C. Price, Benjamin Franklin Professor of Chemistry, University of Pennsylvania; President, Council for a Liveable World

J. Finton Speller, M.D., member, Trial Court Nominating Commission and former Secretary of Health, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Leo Steg, Manager, Space Center, General Electric Co.

Anton Tucher, Vice President, Bank of America; Secretary, San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations

M. Jon Vondracek, Director of Communications, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; Coordinator of National Affairs and Washington Representative, Foreign Policy Association

*Harris L. Wofford, Jr., President, Bryn Mawr College

Jayne M. Wood, Director of Public Education, Overseas Development Council

Charles W. Yost, Chairman of the Board, National Commission on U.S.-China Relations; Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution; Special Adviser to the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; Formerly U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

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*John F. Reichard, Executive Director, "A Declaration of INTERdependence"

Dorothy E. Miller, Administrative Assistant to the Director

*David Wendt, Administrative Assistant for Programs

Lise Korson, Student Assistant; Graduate Student, University of Pennsylvania

INDEX

A

absolute poverty,
    See poverty.
Access to markets, 57, 61, 65
Adams, John Quincy, 20, 86
affluence,
    acceptable, 28-29, 64
    in poor nations, 54
    See also wealth.
aggression, national, 34, 45
agriculture,
    subsidies, 12, 55
    U. S. Department of, 84, 86
    See also food.
aid,
    disillusionment with, 8, 11
    internal distribution of, 53, 63
    large-scale readjustment, 65
    price increases and, 58
    U. S. foreign, 42, 75
    See also basic human needs.
alliances, 25, 56
    See also ANZUS, Atlantic alliance, NATO, French Alliance, North Atlantic Alliance, North Atlantic Council.
Anderson, Robert O., 89
Angola incident, 44
Anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), 36, 48
anticolonialism, 17, 18, 53
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States), 56
Arab embargo, 18, 23, 83
    See also oil prices.
Arab-Israel conflict, 45, 76
arms,
    control, 41, 47
    race, reversing, 48
    sales policy, 42, 48
    See also non-nuclear violence, weapons
Aron, Raymond, 11
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 9, 53, 62

Atlantic alliance, 49
Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 67
attitudes, changing, 90, 93, 94, 99
Australia, 49, 60
automatic majority, 77
See also United Nations.

B

Bailey, Stephen, 8
balance,
among nations, 26
of payments, 43, 58
of power, 34, 38
Barbary pirates, 44
bargaining,
bilateral, 19, 30
international, 58, 80, 83, 84, 86, 96
multilateral, 10, 16
See also planetary bargaining.
basic human needs,
as global issue, 8, 56
as seen by poor countries, 84
international aid and, 11
international standards for, 54, 62, 63
in the ethic of ecology, 29, 64
unmet, 52, 63
See also poverty, wealth.
Bicentennial, American, 1, 2
bilateral relations, 19, 71-73
bioconversion, 41, 66
See also ecology.
bloc voting, 2, 8, 12
See also Group of 77.
Bodine, William, 86
boycott, 45, 95
Brazil,
development planning in, 83
nuclear power and, 39
resources in, 60
transnational enterprises and, 67
Buchanan, James, 21

C

Cabinet Departments, U. S., 84-87
calculated risk, 35
See also deterrence.
calculus of equivalency, 35
Canada, 59, 60
Castro, Fidel, 44
catalytic policy analysis, 78
certainty, 34
See also deterrence.
change, 90, 93, 94, 99
See also growth.
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 61
Charter of the U. N.,
See United Nations.
Chatel, Bernard, 62
China, People's Republic of,
economic dependence of, 13, 16
new economic order and, 56
nuclear testing and, 39
resources of, 60
U. N. Security Council and, 46
choice,
American political, 2, 100
for interdependence, 12
Churchill, Winston, 41
C.I.A., 88
Clark, Dick (Senator), 42
Club of Rome, 16, 28
Cold War, 16, 28
collective,
security, 33, 34
self-reliance, 18, 63, 95
See also Third World.
Colombo, Sri Lanka, 17
colonialism, 17, 18, 53
Committee of Twenty, 68
Committee on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), 58
commodity agreements, 83
Common Market, 13

Commoner, Barry, 28
communications,
  and terrorist threats, 44
  for international peace, 47
  global, 25, 70, 88, 99
  satellite, 7
Communist countries,
  deterrence and, 37
  international economic order and, 77
  selective interdependence and, 16, 18
community of nations, 8, 98, 99
  See also interdependence.
Congo, Republic of the, 45
Congress, U. S., 19, 87
consensus,
  among nations, 9, 98
  and enforcement, 80
  decision-making, 77
consortium of the concerned, 47, 79
Continental Congress, 19
cooperation,
  international, 3, 44, 64, 66, 75
  in Western Europe, 15
corporations,
  See transnational enterprises.
Covenant of League of Nations, 34, 80
credit, international, 57
Cuba, 35, 36, 71

D

Darwin, Charles, 22, 26
Dees, Bowen, 76
defense,
  mutual, 42
  spending, 5, 33
  stalemate, 6, 50
  systems of, 36
  See also weapons.
democracy, 2, 89

dependence,
    economic, 13, 16, 88
    mutual, 13-14, 15, 16, 19, 23
    See also interdependence.
dependencia, 17, 19
destiny, national, 1, 2
detente, 37, 49, 71
    See also nuclear power.
deterrence,
    nuclear, 41
    regional, 42
    superpowers and, 37, 49, 95
    uncertainty and, 34, 39
    See also weapons.
developing nations,
    economic growth of, 51, 57, 58, 87
    oceans and the, 59
    relations with industrialized democracies, 18, 54, 61
    solidarity of, 59, 60, 61
    See also Third World, Group of 77.
development, 83, 97
    See also growth, *dependencia.*
disarmament, 37
disasters, man-made, 18, 64
distribution of wealth,
    See wealth.
Doherty, William, 50.
domestic,
    attitudes, 83
    Council, 85, 86
    international relations, 84, 86, 89
    pressures in the U. S., 91
    reforms, 50, 53

E

Earthwatch, 7
East-West relations,
    See deterrence, detente.
ecology,
    discovery of, 94
    ethic of, 28-31, 98, 99
    international standards and, 64
    life sciences and, 27
    limits of the biosphere and, 53, 55

economic growth,
    See growth, GNP.
education,
    about nuclear threat, 39, 41
    global perspective in, 88, 89, 92
    See also literacy.
Egypt, 42
Ehrlich, Paul, 28
Einstein, Albert, 27
élite,
    See rich.
energy,
    alternative sources of, 41, 83
    consumption of, 22, 56
    natural, 41, 66
    policy, 87
    See also ecology, nuclear energy.
enforcement, 82
entangling alliances, 25
environmental,
    impacts, 29-30, 84
    Programme (U. N.), 76
    protection, 62, 64
    Protection Agency, 84, 93
    support systems, 27
equity,
    See fairness.
equivalency, calculus of, 35
Ethiopia, 42
European Economic Community, 73, 78
European Security Conference, 73
Executive Branch, 43, 85
exports,
    in Iran, 13
    of jobs, 84
    nuclear, 75, 85
    Third World, 57
    See also imports, dependence.

F

Fairlie, Henry, 2

fairness,
economic, 56, 57, 79
ethic of, 28, 96
growth with, 69
in rights and duties, 61, 90
revolution, 6, 49, 99
See also basic human needs, wealth.
family planning, 30, 62, 93
famine,
in the Sahel, 18
Federal Aviation Agency, 84
Federal Reserve Board, 85
food,
distribution of, 63
scarcity of, 12
world production of, 64, 66
world reserve, 55, 66, 74
world system, 83, 86
See also agriculture, U. N.
foreign relations, 20, 21, 86, 87
Founding Fathers, 20, 90
France, 21, 39, 60
freedom from supervision, 89
French Alliance, 20

G

Germany, Federal Republic of, 39, 60, 69
gifts from God, 61, 94
See also resources.
global bargaining, 80
global fairness revolution, 6, 49
See also fairness, planetary bargaining.
GNP (gross national product), 50-51, 52
grassroots origins, 93
Greece, 43
Group of 77,
bloc action of, 57, 58, 63
distribution of wealth and, 61, 63
U. N. and, 74
U. S. and, 59-60
See also North-South axis, solidarity.

growth,
economic, 17, 51, 57, 58
in developed countries, 64
internal, 84
with fairness, 69
See also development.
guerrilla activity, 19, 43

H

Habitat, 77
Hammarskjold, Dag, 78
hazards,
man-made, 29, 30, 64
of military force, 33
Hitler, Adolf, 22, 34
Hoffmann, Stanley, 95
Hoover, Herbert, 21
horizontal management, 85, 97
humane solutions, 28, 97

I

immigration,
to U. S., 21, 55
imports,
alternatives to, 84
Chinese, 13
consumer prices and, 83
oil, 58
Soviet, 16, 86
Third World, 57, 58
U . S., 22-23
See also exports.
indexation, 61
See also stability.
India, 39, 58
individualism,
national, 21, 22
Indonesia, 60, 83
industrial,
democracies, 6, 49, 54, 57
geography, 65, 84
technology, 15

infant mortality, 52
Intelsat, 7, 79
interdependence, 3, 5, 27, 30
    asymmetric, 11, 18, 22
    between foreign-domestic relations, 86, 87
    checklist for, 90-91
    council, 86
    factors creating, 13
    leadership and, 25, 89
    limits of, 11, 12, 25
    National Commission on Coping with, 89, 93
    suspicions regarding, 16-17
    See also international, transnational enterprises.
internal,
    See domestic.
international,
    commons, 7, 67
    control of arms transfers, 43
    cooperation, 3, 44, 64, 66, 75
    money, 12, 68, 85, 89
    organizations, 7, 12
    peacekeeping, 47
    relations, 20, 84
    standards, 54, 62
    taxation, 68
    trade, 6, 55, 83
    See also interdependence, transnational enterprises.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 39, 73
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 54, 58, 68, 73, 75
International Peace Academy, 45, 50
Iran, 13, 83
isolationism, 2, 16, 22
Israel, 39, 43, 83

J

Jackson, Andrew, 21, 22
Japan,
    foreign relations and, 39, 49, 60
    importance of commerce for, 13, 15
    marine technology in, 69
    security treaty with, 56

Jefferson, Thomas, 3, 20, 26, 97

K

Kennedy, John F., 1, 98
Kissinger, Henry, 37, 46, 63
Korea, 35, 43

L

land reform, 66, 96
Lao Tse, 97
laissez-faire, 22
Law of the Sea,
    Conference, 58, 73, 79
    negotiations, 84
    politics, 59
    treaty, 69, 74
    See also oceans.
Lawrence, D. H., 28
leadership,
    executive, 78
    interdependence and, 25, 89
    of developing nations, 96
    shared, 3, 5, 93, 97
    See also U. S.
League of Nations, 2, 34, 80
Lebanon,
    world-scale, 99
life expectancy, 52
limits,
    of dependence, 12
    system of, 28, 30
literacy, 51, 52
Locke, John, 20, 26
London group, 47

M

Madison, James, 10, 20, 26, 97, 98
management, horizontal, 85
    See also leadership.
Mankind at the Turning Point, 28
    See also Club of Rome.
Mao Tse-tung, 94

markets,
industrial-nation, 57, 61, 84
stability of, 61, 65, 87
unfairness of, 57
Marshall Plan, 54
Martin, Edwin, 59
Marxist,
czars, 16, 97
nonparticipation, 8
societies, 6, 97
Mayaguez incident, 44
McCloy, John J., 35
McElroy, William, 73
McNamara, Robert, 41, 51, 52
Mead, Margaret, 34
media,
See communications.
mediation, 46, 48, 63, 64
Mexico, 21, 58, 67, 83
middle-class nations, 51, 52, 58, 83
military,
sales and aid, 42, 43
uncertainty, 34, 64
Milton, John 20
minimum human needs,
See basic human needs.
mobilization bases, nuclear, 40, 47
Monroe, James, 20
Montesquieu (Charles de Secondat), 20
Morgan, Edward P., 52
multilateral relations, 16, 71, 73
Mumford, Lewis, 28

N

National Commission on Coping with Interdependence, 89, 93
National Security Council (NSC), 85
nature, 26, 69, 94, 95
Naval forces, U. S. and Soviet, 38
negotiation,
See bargaining.
Neumann, Robert, 30

New International Economic Order,
avoidance of, 56
creation of, 9
ecology and, 31
purpose of, 54
U. N. and, 57, 83
See also basic human needs.
Newton, Isaac, 26
New Zealand, 49
non-nuclear violence, 44, 47
non-profit organizations, 88
non-proliferation,
treaty, 38, 39
world management and, 40
North Atlantic Alliance, 35, 71
North Atlantic Council, 38, 78
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
economic policy, 56
executive leadership and, 78
multilateral relations and, 71
mutual and balanced force reductions, 37
North-South axis,
as political priority, 49-50
confrontation, 54
ethic of fairness and, 28
multilateral relations and, 74
planetary bargaining and, 63, 67
See also Group of 77, Third World.
nuclear energy,
alternatives to, 41
as power source, 38, 39, 40
dangers of, 39
exports, 85
increased access to, 38
See also nuclear power.
nuclear parenthesis, 41, 47

nuclear power,
arms control and, 41
capacity for, 40
dependence and, 12
stability and, 35, 38
terrorists and, 43
testing of, 36
weapons, 11, 38, 39, 41
See also stalemate.
nutrition in poor nations, 51, 52

O

oceans,
as international "commons," 7, 60, 69
exploitation of, 69
See also Law of the Sea.
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation), 54
oil prices, 18, 58, 74, 79, 86, 95
See also Arab embargo.
OPEC (Organization of Oil Exporting Countries), 17, 18, 59, 66, 67, 80
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/OCDE), 67, 71
Organization of American States (OAS), 73
organizing, 31, 88, 89
overconsumption, 23, 55, 58

P

Paine, Thomas, 20
Pakistan, 19, 39
Paris talks (CIEC), 58
patriotism, 1
Paz, Octavio, 26
peace,
alliances for, 8
economic stability and, 61
international soldiers for, 47
system for, 64
through arms control, 37, 38
U. N. Security Council and, 45, 46
See also planetary bargaining.
Philippines, 42

planetary bargaining,
Group of 77 and, 63
in world political economy, 9, 49, 56, 65
mutual respect and, 98
poverty and, 53, 68
See also basic human needs.
pluralism,
international, 30, 78, 88
system of, 64, 79
U. S., 10, 76, 88, 89
plutonium, reprocessing, 38, 40
politics,
American, 2, 19, 84
balance-of-power, 30, 34
choice in, 2
internal, 83
international, 20, 96
solidarity and, 58
world order, 23, 39, 71, 100
pollution, 11, 30, 62
poor nations,
See Third World, poverty.
population,
basic human needs and, 62
growth, 51, 93
resources and, 62
world, 6, 58
populism, 18
poverty,
absolute, 52, 53
limit to, 28
national, 51, 52, 54
power of, 96
world, 50, 53
See also basic human needs, wealth, rich.
power,
changing nature of, 95, 96
of disruption, 95
of poverty, 96
shared, 5
See also nuclear.

prevention of conflicts, 46-47
Price, Charles, 70
Pueblo incident, 44

R

Race, Jeffrey, 45
reforms, 50, 53
relativity, social, 27
resources,
    allocation of, 63
    non-renewable, 29, 30, 60, 64
    waste of, 64, 94
    world, 58, 60, 62
responsibility,
    sharing in management, 85
    toward world economy, 55, 61
revenue-sharing,
    from the oceans, 59, 69
reversing the arms race, 47
Reykjavik, NATO meeting at, 37
Rhodesian boycott, 45
rich,
    elite within nations, 6, 58, 96
    nations, 6
    poor axis, 28, 57
    See also wealth.
Richardson, Elliot, 25
rights of man, 20, 61, 62, 90
rough equivalency, 37
Rusk, Dean, 77

S

safeguard, 36
Sahel (Africa), 18, 96
satellites, 7, 79
scarcity, guaranteed, 55
    See also agriculture.
Schelling, Thomas, 40
scientific,
    See technological advance.
Secretary of State, 21, 86, 87

security,
against terrorists, 44
collective, 33, 34
internal, 42
interdependence and, 12
self-renewal, American, 1, 100
Smith, Adam, 26
shuttle diplomacy, 46
solidarity,
of developing nations, 58, 59
of industrial nations, 65
Third World, 18-19, 74
See also Group of 77.
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander I., 28
South Africa, 60
South Korea, 83
space, outer, 7, 70
See also communications.
Special Drawing Rights,
See international money.
specialization, 25
stability,
economic, 57, 61
political, 37
stalemate,
nuclear power and, 16, 35, 36
strategic arms and, 37
Western unity and, 38
standards,
See basic human needs, international.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 36
strategic warfare,
See weapons.
subsidies,
See agriculture.
Sukarno, 97
Switzerland, 40
symbiosis, 94

T

Taiwan, 83

Taylor, Edmund, 90
Tawney, R. H., 95
technological advances,
begun in the U. S., 55
international implications of, 7, 15
Third World access to, 57
unprecedented, 99
Teng Hsiao-ping, 35
terrorists,
deterrents to, 44, 47
distribution of wealth and, 50
nuclear power and, 43
third person,
See mediation.
Third World,
bargaining, 58
dependencia, 17, 19
leadership, 97
neocolonialism and, 17
nuclear power, 39
U. N. and the, 67, 74
See also developing nations, Group of 77, fairness.
Thomas, Lewis, 27
trade,
General Agreement on Tariffs and, 75
international, 6, 55, 83
union of the developing countries, 61
transnational enterprises,
developing countries and, 17
growth of, 67
politics and, 13, 83
regulation of, 57
technology and, 12
U. N. Center on, 75
world trade and, 6, 50, 87
See also New International Economic Order.
Truman Administration, 85
Turkey, 43
two-tier international system, 79, 80

U

uncertainty, nuclear, 34, 43
See also deterrence.
United Nations,
as new framework for world order, 74, 77
Center on Transnational Corporations, 75
Charter, 34, 74, 80
collective security and, 34
Commission on Transnational Corporations, 17
Conference on Trade and Development, 58, 75
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 51, 75
Environmental Programme, 76
Food and Agriculture Organization, 66, 74
forums, 17
Industrial Development Organization, 58
Institute for Training and Research, 78
in the Congo, 45
Legal Committee, 47
New International Economic Order and, 57
Security Council, 45, 46
United States and, 22, 46, 75
voting procedure, 77, 78
See also Group of 77.
United States,
advances in technology, 55
Cabinet departments, 84-87
Congress, 20, 86, 87
foreign aid, 42, 75
foreign relations, 18, 19-22, 91, 94
influence in arms control, 42, 43, 47
marine technology, 38, 69
nuclear developments, 40
production, 55
resources, 60
Soviet standoff, 35-38
U. N. and, 22, 46, 75
See also nuclear, interdependence, self-renewal.
uranium enrichment, 39, 40

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)
dependence for food, 13, 16, 85
foreign aid, 53, 58
marine technology, 69
Navy, 38
new economic order and, 56, 60
nuclear standoff and, 35-38
oil production of, 66, 67
resources, 60
U. N., and the, 2, 46

V

Van Buren, Martin, 21
Vienna, NATO negotiations at, 37, 73
Vietnam, 5, 33, 35, 42, 71, 93
Vladivostok (SALT II), 36
Vondracek, Jon, 19
voting,
See bloc voting, U. N.

W

war,
See World War, peace.
Warsaw Pact, 35, 37
wealth, distribution of, 28, 49, 51, 96
See also global fairness revolution, poverty.
Wealth of Nations, The, 26
weapons,
conventional, 5, 30, 33, 44, 95
nuclear, 5, 11, 31, 33, 34, 40, 41, 43, 47, 87
races, 31, 33
strategic, 33, 35, 36, 47
See also arms, nuclear power.
weather,
international standards for, 69
Worldwatch and, 7, 79
Western model, 97
whole system,
See ecology.
Wilde, Oscar, 51
Wilhelm, Kaiser, 34

Wilson, Woodrow, 2
Wofford, Harris, 90
women,
    attitudes toward, 93
    literacy ratio, 51
    Mexico City conference on, 77
    U. N. discussions of, 76
World Bank, 51, 53, 58, 73, 80
World Food Council, 74, 77
world trade,
    See trade, international.
World War,
    One, 21, 34
    Two, 2, 22, 34
    Three, 34

Y

Yarmolinsky, Adam, 65, 86
Yost, Charles, 17, 51



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

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